

BILL H.R. 9783

DATE Oct. 21, 1919 PAGE(S) 9091

To Provide a National Budget System and an Independent  
Audit of Government Accounts, and for Other Purposes.

ACTION Extension of Remarks

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FRANK CROWTHER,

OF NEW YORK.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Tuesday, October 21, 1919.

Mr. CROWTHER. Mr. Speaker, it was my privilege to receive the indorsement of the voters of my district, the thirtieth New York, at the last congressional election, running on a platform of which the three principal planks were "unconditional surrender," "sound protective tariff," and "a national budget system."

"Unconditional surrender" is now a matter of history entirely due to the magnificent showing made by our boys, American soldiers, sailors, and marines, who threw the fear of God into the Huns and made them realize that their race was run.

Regarding "protective tariff," there is a disposition not to take up this important subject, except as a matter of general revision, perhaps not until the regular session. Numerous tariff measures have, however, been passed in the House, opposed in a narrow, partisan spirit by the Democrats, and unjustly so, for these measures are for the protection of industries that were developed in this country at the request of the Government and were a mighty factor in winning the war. I refer to zinc, magnesite, tungsten, chemical glass, and so forth, and, though not a war necessity, a bill for the protection of the pearl-button industry against our dangerous competitor, Japan.

The third plank, "a national budget system," is before us for discussion, and, naturally, I am in favor of its passage and final enactment into law.

Prior to 1912 very little had ever been written on the subject of "a national budget," and it looked as though we should go on forever voting appropriations in a haphazard sort of way and lump-sum appropriations in time of emergency, as we did in the late war. Thoughtful citizens were impressed by the statement of Senator Aldrich a few years ago that "if only Federal business were run in a businesslike way \$300,000,000 a year might be saved to this Government."

This bill provides a bureau of the budget composed of a director and an assistant director, to be appointed by the President, who, with the other officials named in this bill, will assist the President in the preparation of the budget, he in turn submitting it to the Congress after careful scrutiny as to the necessity of alterations. This is an eminently fair and wise provision, for the President can not fairly be held responsible for proper centrally reviewed estimates unless given a budget staff for investigation of needs, analyses, and comparison of estimates and the formulation of a tentative program.

The easier it is for Congress and the public to understand the why and wherefore of executive estimates the more time they can give to intelligent discussion of proposals and the less time that need be wasted in doing what official clerks should do, thus losing sight of needs. Congress has been the subject of keen criticism for a great many years for its extravagance and wasteful methods of handling the people's money. Even though through pork-barrel legislation they have merited this criticism, there is no doubt whatever but what Congress has been made the scapegoat for gross errors in estimating and spending by executive departments.

Provision for an independent audit of Government accounts by the creation of an "accountancy department" is a salient feature of this bill. This department is to be in charge of a comptroller general and an assistant comptroller general, to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. This provision establishes the integrity of these appointments during changing administrations and removes any suggestion of political influence.

In a word, the budget bill is a clean-cut, well-defined business proposition. It will carry with it a message of confidence to the people of this great United States, and it also directs their attention that it is the fulfillment of a pledge made by the Republican Party.

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# CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Proceedings and Debates of the 66th Congress  
LD-4 (Rev. Nov. 78)

HOUSE

BILL

H. R. 9783

DATE

Oct. 21, 1919

PAGE(S)

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ACTION Passed

## THE BUDGET.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 9783.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 9783, with Mr. TOWNER in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 9783, which the Clerk will report by title.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 9783) to provide a national budget system and an independent audit of Government accounts, and for other purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the bill.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I submit the following amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska: Page 8, strike out all of lines 1 to 7, inclusive.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Where is that?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Page 8, the first paragraph.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, let us have the amendment again reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will again report the amendment.

There was no objection.

The amendment was again reported.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I ask the Clerk to read the lines of the bill proposed to be stricken out by this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the Clerk will read.

There was no objection.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 8, line 1:

"When a comptroller general or assistant comptroller general attains the age of 70 years, he shall be retired from his office, and, if he has held the office from which he is retired, during the 10 preceding consecutive years, he shall, during the remainder of his natural life, be entitled to one-half the salary he is receiving at the time of his retirement from the office which he then held."

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute for the amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Nebraska has been recognized, but the substitute of the gentleman can be reported for the information of the committee.

The Clerk read as follows:

Substitute by Mr. CLARK of Missouri: On page 8, line 3, strike out all of the paragraph after the word "office," in line 3, down to the end of line 7.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, this paragraph relates to the question of retirement upon half pay at the age of 70 years provided 10 years of service have been rendered. The whole paragraph relates to this subject of retirement with half pay, and the elimination of the entire paragraph to be followed by an amendment on page 7 will cover the question so as to leave the situation as it now stands. The comptroller and assistant comptroller under the present rule hold what are termed continuing commissions. They are not appointed for a series of years or a fixed period of time. Their commissions run now at the pleasure of the appointing power, the President of the United States. If this amendment should be stricken out the provisions of this bill would then leave the continuance of these officers in service according to the pleasure of Congress. The President would appoint and thereafter under the terms of this bill lose the power of removal. The Congress would then have the power of removal, and if at any time Congress should see fit to make a change in these positions the way would be clear for it to do so, either before or after the retirement date. If this paragraph goes out and a man serving acceptably and efficiently had reached the age of 70 years, still in physical and mental vigor, could go on with the service here just as they go on with their service in the House and in the Senate. It will then be a question for Congress to determine whether the physical and intellectual condition of the comptroller general or the assistant comptroller general is such as to warrant continuance. They would serve at the pleasure of the Congress and no interruption would be occasioned by the cancellation of this entire paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member desire to be heard in opposition to the amendment?

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I desire to close debate, and I desire to see whether there is any other gentleman on the committee who would like to speak in favor of the amendment of

the gentleman from Nebraska. I take it that the question will first come on the substitute.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I am going to withdraw the substitute for the present and offer it after this amendment is voted upon, provided the amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska is voted down.

Mr. GOOD. If there is no other gentleman desiring to speak in favor of the amendment I will ask that debate upon this amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska be closed in five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa asks that debate on this amendment be closed in five minutes. Is there objection?

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object—

Mr. GOOD. Does the gentleman desire to discuss it? I only desire to close whatever debate is had.

Mr. WALSH. I was wondering why the gentleman did not close right away.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, this will not close debate on the balance of the section because there are other amendments?

Mr. GOOD. Not at all; it is on this single amendment.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman—

Mr. GOOD. The question is on the unanimous-consent request I have submitted to the House.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection has been made by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH].

Mr. GOOD. I did not understand that the gentleman from Massachusetts made any objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the gentleman from Massachusetts object?

Mr. WALSH. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the request for unanimous consent made by the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GOOD]. Is there objection?

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer a substitute to strike out this entire section, and I want to be heard for three or four minutes.

Mr. GOOD. My request will not preclude the gentleman from offering an amendment or speaking to his amendment. My request refers to the pending amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. ANDREWS] strikes out the entire paragraph. The paragraph contains two provisions, first, that the comptroller general shall be retired at the age of 70 years. That stands by itself as a distinct provision. And then it provides for the retirement. Now, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CLARK] desires to offer a separate amendment, simply striking out the provision with regard to retirement, and I do not care particularly to speak on that provision now. But the entire provision is the present provision of law with regard to Federal judges. That provision with regard to Federal judges is:

That when any judge of any court of the United States, appointed to hold his office during good behavior, resigns his office after having held a commission or commissions as judge of any such court or courts at least 10 years continuously, and having attained the age of 70 years, he shall, during the residue of his natural life, receive the salary which is payable at the time of his resignation for the office that he held at the time of his resignation.

Now, Mr. Chairman, when the bill was originally introduced it did not contain this provision, but it became apparent as the committee heard the witnesses that this office ought to be entirely removed from politics. The office is a semi-judicial one, and it will require a man of high standing, a man who is a lawyer, and a man who is familiar with auditing accounts. In order to make him an official of the United States it is necessary under the Constitution of the United States to place the appointing power in the President. But the official is at all times subject to the will of Congress, and if he becomes inefficient in office he can be removed by a concurrent resolution. If he fails to do his duty, if he performs his duty in a corrupt way, he can be removed, and it seemed to the committee that when a man attains the age of 70 years or thereabouts he ought to retire.

It ought not to be left to Congress to pass a concurrent resolution to remove a man who is old, because the sentiment in Congress would be with a man who had performed valuable services. Congress would hesitate to oust a man because he was old. To strike out the whole provision would be a great mistake it seems to me. If it is the desire of the committee to strike out the provision with regard to retirement, that is a different proposition; but we ought to have a law that will compel him to resign or make him ineligible to hold the office

when he has become old, and who by reason of his old age would not be as alert to perform the duties of the office as a younger man. The provisions of law with regard to the judges have been found to be a very valuable safeguard in this respect. Therefore the committee accepted that principle as laid down in the law already on the statute books and which has been on the statute books for a great many years.

Mr. BEE. Will the gentleman yield for a question for information?

Mr. GOOD. I yield.

Mr. BEE. These appointments are made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Will the gentleman be kind enough to explain to us on what theory Congress would have the right to control—I am asking for information—the tenure of office, by removal or otherwise?

Mr. GOOD. Well, the provision in the bill, as the gentleman is well aware, is—

Mr. BEE. I understand the provision is there, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to know about the constitutional power of Congress over an officer appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. GOOD. I have not the time in five minutes to enter into that question now. I think the provision in this bill will meet the constitutional requirements.

Mr. MADDEN. The Constitution provides that we can fix the time.

Mr. GOOD. We fixed the tenure of office here by this law, and the tenure of office is only during the rendering of the kind of service required and during the good behavior provided for in the law.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Did the gentleman from Missouri desire to withdraw his amendment?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes. If this amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska is voted down, then I shall offer this immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri is withdrawn.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes. This amendment deals with a most serious question. I believe every Member of this House, almost, will agree, at least so far as details are concerned.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, debate is exhausted under the agreement, and I have no desire to extend the debate on the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Debate is closed.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not think he would be justified in submitting that unanimous-consent request.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the debate is closed.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman can not obtain the floor for debate under those circumstances. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. ANGEWS].

The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the yeas seemed to have it.

Mr. BEANTON. Division, Mr. Chairman.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 8, nays 49.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. CLARK of Missouri: On page 8, line 2, strike out all of paragraph after the word "office," where it first occurs in line 3, down to end of line 7, and add a period after the said word "office."

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, my amendment strikes out the provision to retire the comptroller general and assistant comptroller general on the retired list at half pay for life. I am in favor of the budget system, and I always have been ever since I first got the hang of things here. But this proposition to put these two men on the retired list at half pay is the first long step in establishing a retired list from the civilian forces of the Government. They work at it all the time. Everybody knows that. They are very estimable people. I have not any criticism of them, and I do not blame them for undertaking to fix a soft berth for themselves. But we are the trustees of the money of the people of the United States, and there is no reason on earth that can be assigned why a man who draws a \$10,000 salary and the other one who draws the \$7,500 after 10 years'

service should be put on the retired list for life, one at \$5,000 a year and the other at \$3,750 per annum for life.

Now, you begin this once, and there is no end to it. There are, as I understand, about a million and a half Government employees, every one of them wanting his salary raised, or if it had occurred to them—which it had not, probably, when this bill was brought in here—to be retired on half pay. There is not a bit of reason why these men should be retired on half pay.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. CANNON. Bills are pending and sentiment is running to retire everybody in the civil service at a given age at half pay. I am against that.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. So am I. [Applause.] So that there is nothing for us to quarrel about.

Mr. CANNON. No; nothing. But, being against that, I think maybe this would be a bad precedent.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I think so, too.

Mr. CANNON. If perchance the 70 years come and anything happens, then the Congress in being might make an exception. I do not know whether it would or not. But this is the nose of the camel.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Of course it is. I want somebody to straighten out that camel's nose business. [Laughter.] There have been several versions of it.

Mr. EVANS of Nevada. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. EVANS of Nevada. Who can tell the mental and physical condition of a man at 70? There is no uniform rule to go by. Some men at 80 are younger men than others at 50.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes. Clemenceau is 79.

Mr. EVANS of Nevada. A man might be incapacitated for a year or two and continued forward in order to retain that pension. It is a dangerous thing to try to start it.

Mr. DUNBAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. DUNBAR. The gentleman has informed the House concerning the ancient Clemenceau. Will he also inform the House of his own age and that of Uncle Joe CANNON?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes. Speaker CANNON's age is 83. Gen. SNYDER is 84. I am 69. The Speaker of the House is 68—right in the bloom of youth, just beginning to be Speaker. [Applause.] If he is Speaker as long as Speaker CANNON was—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. May I have five minutes more?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri asks unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes more. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HULINGS rose.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Now, General.

Mr. HULINGS. Is the gentleman in favor of retiring at the age of 70 years these officers, the comptroller general and assistant?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. No; I am not.

Mr. HULINGS. When the Democratic Party has arranged in its mind now to put a man in as President of the United States who is about 69?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. They are running one that is 75.

Mr. HULINGS. But they are all looking forward to putting a 69-year-old youth in as President. [Applause.]

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I understand that. I am much obliged. [Prolonged applause.] I will confess that when the general began I was not certain about the identity of the 69-year-old man. [Laughter.] Gladstone was premier of England at 83, and Palmerston as long as he lived. I think he was about 85 when he went out.

I do not care anything about the 70-year provision. I think maybe it is a bad one, but I am in dead earnest about this other thing, and I warn the House now that if they put these people on the retired list at half pay, the next time somebody wants to be put on the retired list at half pay or at full pay you can not with a straight face make objection to it. We have already two classes on the retired list. We have the United States judges, who retire on full pay when they have served 10 years and get to be 70, and you have the Army and Navy officers retiring on three-fourths pay, the Army at 61, and I believe they have raised the Navy to 64.

If the Spanish War had been postponed six months, Admiral Dewey never would have won the Battle of Manila Bay. He never would have been there, for he would have been on the retired list. I do not care so much about that, but I do care about

this other thing. People want these offices, all of them. You let a vacancy occur in one of them and there will be a dozen or two dozen applications for each one of them at the present salary. I am in favor of this and have been in favor of it for 10 or 15 years—to get up some kind of a system by which these Government employees will arrange a plan that a good actuary will say will save the Government from paying these pensions or salaries for civilians on the retired list, and whenever they do that I will vote for it. And I will go further than that. They say that these old ones will contribute nothing to the fund and the younger ones will have to pay it. If they will have that actuary work out a scheme by which the Government will be saved whole from paying these pensions afterwards I am willing to vote for one appropriation to take care of the old ones; that is, this generation of old ones, not the next generation. Let those of coming generations take care of themselves.

We talk much about economy. Here is the place to begin it. It is true it is only \$5,000 in one case and half of \$7,500 in the other. But this world is made up of little things. You have all sung that old song—

Little drops of water, little grains of sand—

And so forth, and if we can not make any big economies we surely can make some small ones. I am not a cheese-paring statesman. I think people should be paid wages tantamount to the work they do. I do not know who is going to be appointed comptroller general, and I do not care three straws; but if he gets \$10,000 for 10 years, why can he not save a little of it? It is awfully hard to save any on \$7,500 [laughter]; I have found that out by sad experience. But if we go on increasing every fellow's salary that wants it increased and retiring them this Government will get so topheavy that it will topple over. That is all I have got to say about it. [Applause.]

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I should like to see if some agreement can be made about time on this amendment.

SEVERAL MEMBERS. Let us vote now.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I desire to use five minutes on this amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that the debate close in five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa asks unanimous consent to close debate on this amendment in five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have not had time to find out just when Congress placed the retirement provision on the statute books with regard to Federal judges. I find in the Revised Statutes of 1878, which was a revision of the Revised Statutes of 1863, that the provision which I have read was on the statute books at that time. Therefore more than 50 years ago Congress provided by law that Federal judges upon their retirement should be retired at full pay. That has been the law for more than 50 years, and there has been no other official to whom it has been applied.

Mr. WALSH and Mr. WELTY rose.

Mr. WELTY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WALSH].

Mr. WALSH. Is the gentleman in favor of retiring bank examiners and other Federal employees who get \$10,000 and \$12,000 a year?

Mr. GOOD. No.

Mr. WALSH. Then why is he in favor of this particular provision?

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I will tell the gentleman why I am in favor of this. I think there are a great many good Federal judges upon the Federal bench to-day who would not be there if it were not for the retirement provision. They could make twice as much in the practice of the law, and if it was not for the fact that they will be retired at a certain age with pay the office would not attract them at all. They could not afford to accept it. I hope the salary of this great office will be attractive enough so that a man like John J. Fitzgerald or Swagar Sherley, men who to-day are recelving or making more than twice the amount of the salary of this official, would be attracted to the position, and that in this position, where the official will be called upon to pass upon billions of dollars per year, the man at the head of it will be of high character and high integrity, and that he will be able to conduct his office in such a manner that it will reflect credit not only upon him but upon the office itself.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa, and Mr. WELTY rose.

Mr. WELTY. Will the gentleman yield now?

Mr. GOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Has it not always been understood that the reason why this retirement provision was enacted with reference to Federal judges was because the Constitution pro-

vided that they should hold their office for life, and if some such provision was not enacted men who were really disabled by sickness or other cause would hang on to the office for years after they were incapacitated?

Mr. GOOD. I think that had something to do with it, and I think it was also done to make the office attractive to great lawyers. The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CLARK] says that \$10,000 is a big salary. The Speaker of this House receives \$12,000 a year, and that has been the salary for a number of years, but I never heard either the Speaker or any ex-Speaker say that that salary was too large. I want to say that we must make this office attractive enough to invite the very best ability obtainable. I do not believe you will be able to get that kind of ability unless you place some retirement provision in the bill. I do not believe you are going to get that kind of a man unless you hold out some inducement of this sort. For more than 50 years we have had on the statute books a retirement provision for judges. I have said before that if this were the beginning of a retirement provision I would not offer it in the bill, because as a general proposition I am opposed to it, but I feel that this office is to be akin to that of a Federal judge, and if so I want to see it attractive enough so that we can get a man of high character and splendid attainments to occupy the position.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. All time has expired. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CLARK].

The question being taken, on a division (demanded by Mr. Good) there were—ayes 57, noes 45.

Accordingly the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. CLARK of Missouri: On page 7, line 18, after the word "time," insert the words "and who shall be removable at the pleasure of the President or."

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply gives the President of the United States the right to remove these men whenever he gets ready. If these officers are going to be as important as the chairman of the committee [Mr. Good] makes out, then it would be both a calamity and an outrage to compel the President of the United States to keep these men in office after he came to doubt either their integrity, their capacity, or their friendliness toward either himself or his administration. There can not be any two opinions about that.

Mr. CANNON and Mr. BEE rose.

Mr. BEE. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. BEE. I want to ask the gentleman if there would not be danger in having a double control? In other words, the President will have the right to remove and the Congress will have the right to remove. Suppose the President did not want to remove a man, but Congress did remove him, would there not be a conflict, then, between the executive and the legislative branch?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I think not.

Mr. BEE. I would like to ask the gentleman this further question: What power is possessed by the Congress to remove from office by concurrent resolution a man who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I do not believe there is any.

Mr. BEE. Then that ought to be stricken out.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Anybody else can make the motion who wants to.

Mr. STEVENSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. STEVENSON. I beg to call the gentleman's attention to the fact that the provision that they can be removed for no other cause and in no other manner is directly in conflict with section 4 of Article II of the Constitution, which says that civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of certain things.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I was going to state that.

Mr. STEVENSON. This provision sweeps away the power of impeachment. I have an amendment to include impeachment.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. There are several gentlemen here to-day who were not here yesterday, and I will state over again a case that might arise. If the President appoints a man of eminence and great ability, that man will have opinions of his own, which may come in conflict with those of the President. The President is responsible for his administration. It

would be a very curious condition to have the comptroller general and the President at loggerheads without any way of getting rid of the comptroller general except by this cumbersome congressional joint resolution.

President Johnson got crossways with Secretary of War Stanton. It is no use to discuss the question as to which of them was right and which of them was wrong. The President removed Secretary Stanton temporarily. In the meantime, as the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Fess] states, Congress had passed the tenure of office act. The President had to submit his reasons to the Senate for suspending Stanton. The Senate refused to recognize his reasons as sufficient. In the meantime, while the Secretary of War was in suspense, Gen. Grant was appointed Secretary of War ad interim, and, as I stated yesterday, President Johnson and Gen. Grant fell out and came to be mortal enemies, so bitter that Johnson would not ride with Grant to the Capitol, and I do not suppose that any power on earth would have made him ride with him short of physical force. Anyhow, Stanton went back and took the office again.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I would like five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. There is one case that illustrates what might happen, and it is the only case I know of, because, as I said yesterday, the Republicans repealed the act as soon as Grant was sworn in.

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman from Missouri yield?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I will.

Mr. FESS. The office of Stanton was a constitutional office provided for in the Constitution and not the office of the head of a department.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. That is true.

Mr. FESS. This is a statutory office and would not have the same force that it would have in the case of a constitutional office.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Congress is not under the slightest obligation to create a Cabinet office. Members of the Cabinet are simply head clerks; that is all they ever have been or ever will be. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Good] says that this comptroller general is going to have more power than a Cabinet officer, and probably more power than all the Cabinet officers put together. Suppose he and the President got at loggerheads, do not you think he should be fired?

Mr. FESS. If the law that created the office is to be for good behavior, it would appear to me that the President's power to remove would in that case be inhibitive.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. If I was President and I had one of these statesmen under me and he did not do things to suit me he would be fired as sure as the world. [Laughter.]

Mr. FAIRFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. I will.

Mr. FAIRFIELD. I would like to ask what function the comptroller general will have that would interfere or forward any difficulty between him and the President. In other words, what are the specific functions of the comptroller general?

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. To tell the gentleman the truth, nobody knows. [Laughter.] I will give you another illustration, cited by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Stringer]. Right in the middle of Gen. Jackson's service, toward the beginning of his second administration, the Senate passed a resolution of censure on him for certain performances of his, removing the bank deposits, and so forth. Immediately after they voted the censure Senator Benton hopped up and notified the Senate that he was going to move to expunge the resolution. As the gentleman from South Carolina says, the only way to punish a President is by impeachment, and he is entirely correct.

Benton made a flaming speech; said he knew he was not going to get it expunged then, but he was making the speech for educational purposes to circulate throughout the country. They beat his resolution to expunge. At the next session he offered it again, coming a little nearer to expunging it. The sentiment in the country changed; every time an anti-Jackson Senator resigned or died they elected a Jackson Senator in his place. Finally, after five or six years, Senator Benton got it expunged, and it is one of the greatest curiosities in Washington. Col. Roosevelt said, in his Life of Benton, that it was all tomfoolery. Senator Vest said, in his speech on Benton, that it was all tomfoolery; but it was not; it was to establish what is the truth, that they have no right to punish a President except by impeachment.

Benton described the way that it should be expunged. Before that, when they offered to repeal it, he would not have it, but he directed the clerk to draw great black lines around the resolution and write on the face of it, "Expunged by the Senate" on a certain day.

If you people here think that the old-time statesmen did not know anything about playing tricks, you read his book on how he got that expunged. They did not have any saloons or eating houses on the Hill in those days. He forced an all night session. He loaded up his committee room with everything good to eat and drink, and his supporters went out two or three at a time, and loaded up with these good things. The anti-Jackson fellows did not have anything to eat or drink, and that was the way he accomplished it in 1837.

This clumsy arrangement of Congress removing the comptroller is all stuff. If the man was favored by the President, the entire administration would be here lobbying to keep him from being removed by a resolution of Congress; and, believe me, they have some influence when it comes to a vote. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, if the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri is adopted it will devitalize the most important provision in the bill. The illustration given by the gentleman from Missouri is not analogous to the case before us. Stanton was a member of the Cabinet. This man we are providing for as comptroller auditor general of the United States is not a Cabinet officer.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Will the gentleman allow a question?

Mr. MADDEN. Certainly.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Does not the gentleman from Illinois think that this man is bigger than that of a Cabinet member or all of the Cabinet members put together?

Mr. MADDEN. Not at all; the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri giving power to the President of the United States to discharge this man whenever he pleases makes the office of the comptroller auditor general a political football.

That is what we are trying to avoid. We are trying in this bill to take away the power of the President of the United States to spend the money and at the same time audit his own expenditures. We are trying to give the power of audit to the people, and this provision of the bill reported by the committee does exactly that. The amendment of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clark] takes the power away from the people, takes away the safeguards that we are trying to throw around the expenditure of the people's money. The comptroller auditor general has no power to take away the discretion of a Cabinet officer as to what shall be done in the discharge of his duty, but he has the power only to pass upon the legal phases of the expenditure of the appropriations, and incidentally to report any delinquencies that may be found in any department in the course of the execution of the work of the department. Throw away the safeguards that this provision of the bill places around the expenditures and you make chaos worse confounded. What we are trying to do is to get away from politics. What the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clark] is trying to do is to put us into politics. The man who is the comptroller general should be the instrument of the people, provided for by the Congress, and if you adopt the amendment suggested you destroy every vestige of the people's right to supervise and survey the expenditure of their own money.

I think I may safely leave the case with the committee, feeling assured that every man here, even including the gentleman who offered the amendment, wants this provision retained by the representatives of the people, and wants to do away with political chicanery that may follow the appointment and discharge of a man holding this high place by the President of the United States.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, it has been suggested that no one knows the range of authority and jurisdiction of the comptroller. I hold in my hand a copy of the law that fixes that as it stands to-day, and I want to ask the chairman of the committee a question. To what extent, if any, would his bill modify existing law in relation to the accounting system, in the main?

Mr. GOOD. It gives him some additional power. It gives him the power to go into offices and to call for information that I do not believe the auditors now have.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. But, if I understand it correctly, it does not destroy any of the vital principles of the accounting system as it now stands?

Mr. GOOD. Oh, no; it strengthens them, and requires that he shall report to Congress.



Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will permit, I do not quite agree with the chairman. What this bill does is this. In the matter of accounting it provides that instead of following the heads of appropriations as now, the accounting system shall follow the head of the budget as proposed, and it revolutionizes the accounting system to the extent of furnishing information in detail that it is not possible to obtain under the present law.

Mr. EVANS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MADDEN. I have not the floor.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. I yield.

Mr. EVANS of Nebraska. I would like to have the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MADDEN] explain in what way there would be an audit when an item is put in by the Congress which was not in the budget.

Mr. MADDEN. The audit is made after the expenditure, not before.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I am confident that any form the budget may assume will not materially modify the fundamental laws of the accounting system as it now stands. Neither the President of the United States, a member of his Cabinet, nor anyone that has a claim before the comptroller general, has any right to dictate to him what his decision shall be upon the law and the facts involved in the case. It is a judicial determination, just as clear and distinct as any question in court, and the chairman of this committee is absolutely right when he says that judicial powers reside here and must be exercised by the comptroller general. Beyond that the President can not go; beyond that a Cabinet officer can not go; beyond that a claimant can not go. There is a course of procedure, however, which may be adopted. Anyone who feels aggrieved by the decision, taking issue with the finding of the comptroller, may go to the Court of Claims and sue there to protect his rights, and may also go on to the Supreme Court of the United States. Here is a direct line of judicial procedure. If we should strike out this provision of the bill which would give to Congress the power to remove the comptroller general, we would destroy one of the most commendable features of the bill. The committee has made a very happy solution of this matter—appointment by the President and removal by the Congress, the comptroller to hold his position under a continuing commission in the future, as now.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska has expired.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. FESS. Is the contention of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. STEVENSON] that the provision in the Constitution which provides for the removal by impeachment for malfeasance in office is nullified by this proposed law?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. I do not think so.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Yes.

Mr. CANNON. It takes a majority to impeach and two-thirds of the Senate to convict. This bill, if it passes, will make a majority of the House and a majority of the Senate all that is necessary to remove.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Just as the President would exercise the power of removal, if it were left with him.

Mr. CANNON. So that there will never be any impeachment—

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. In all probability not.

Mr. CANNON. There would be a remedy—in fact, an immediate opportunity to dispense with a dishonest man.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. In other words, if we discover wrongdoing we want to settle it at once, and this provides the way.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Yes.

Mr. STEVENSON. I have not contended that you could not remove them in this way. The part I am calling attention to is this, that they can be removed by concurrent resolution of the Congress, after notice and hearing, when in their judgment the comptroller general or the assistant comptroller general has been inefficient or guilty of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, and for no other cause and in no other way. I call attention—

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman. I can not yield further in connection with that unless I can have five minutes more, in which event I shall be glad to

yield. There are other amendments which may be offered which will not affect the vital element in this section and this feature of the bill.

Mr. Chairman, let me call the attention of members of the committee to this fact. During the preceding years and under the system of accounting as it stands now when you call upon accounting officers to come here and disclose the record of facts, you are asking them to come and give testimony substantially against the men who hold their official lives in their hands. Under the arrangement here provided, if the House should call upon these officers, as it will have occasion to do, to come here and disclose contracts, vouchers, disclose the record in any question under investigation, they will be disclosing information to the body that has in its hands the power to insist upon a correct showing of facts. Hence there will be removed all tendency to withhold information or evade a statement of facts. If you destroy this provision of the bill you destroy a large portion of the benefits of an independent accounting system.

Mr. REAVIS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. I do.

Mr. REAVIS. The gentleman heard the statement of the gentleman from South Carolina, where this bill says, in lines 22 and 23, page 7, that his removal shall be for no other cause and in no other manner. Now, the Constitution provides the manner of impeachment. What does the gentleman think of the constitutionality of this provision that he can not be removed in the constitutional way?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments, one proposing to strike out all of line 17, except the last two words, and another amendment to strike out all after the word "office," in line 22, and the word "manner," in line 23. That will remove that objection and clear the way absolutely, so far as any question concerning impeachment is concerned. Then we will have it upon clear ground.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, the adoption of the pending amendment, in my opinion, would destroy one of the most desirable and meritorious features of this bill. The comptroller general is not expected or intended to have any official relation with the President of the United States in so far as auditing accounts are concerned; and for my part, if there had been any way under the Constitution whereby we could have provided for his appointment by Congress I would have favored it. The comptroller general is expected to audit the accounts and the expenditures made by the various departments, whereas under the present system the spending departments of the Government audit their own accounts. Now, the comptroller general, when he audits those accounts, will be responsible to the body which makes the appropriation and not to the spending departments of the Government. He not only audits the accounts, but he passes upon the expenditures and construes the statutes passed by Congress relative to appropriations. So, I say, if we now undertook to permit the President of the United States to remove this official at his will and pleasure we would destroy the very object and very purpose of the committee in making this recommendation to the House. This bill provides that the comptroller general shall be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and then he can only be removed by a concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress. This makes him responsible to Congress and not to the President. He is subject to the will of Congress and every committee in furnishing it information. He is expected to advise Congress as to improvements that may be made in the matter of expenditures.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. I will.

Mr. ALEXANDER. If we do not make this department or bureau independent of the executive departments of the Government why not let the law stay as it is now?

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. The gentleman from Missouri is clearly correct in that statement. Under the present law the Comptroller of the Treasury construes appropriation statute, and under a recent departmental order he has charge of the auditing of the various expenditures; but if we are going to leave this official responsible to the President and not to Congress then there is no reason whatever for passing this particular provision, so I hope this amendment will not be adopted. Now, it has been suggested that we are undertaking by law to repeal a part of the Constitution relative to impeachment. Why, of course, we do not undertake to deny the right of impeachment guaranteed by the Constitution; but, as has been suggested, this concurrent resolution simply provides a readier and quicker way of getting rid of an incompetent and inefficient official by simply providing that a majority of both Houses may

pass a resolution and dispose of him. The right of impeachment still exists, and we could not disturb it if we would.

Mr. BLACK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. I will.

Mr. BLACK. Does not the gentleman think that the language "has been inefficient or guilty of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" is really surplusage, for when any future session of Congress adopts a simple resolution removing this official that Congress could do so, because that in effect would be a repeal of the requirement? In other words, Congress having the power to create the office would have the power to remove the official without alleging any cause, and it seems to me that it should just be a matter of removal at any time by concurrent resolution.

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. That may be true, Mr. Chairman, but it was the idea of the committee in making this recommendation to remove this official as far as we could from politics.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. I ask for one minute more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. The idea in adopting this provision was to take this official as far as possible out of politics and not make him subject to change of political administrations, and therefore we have expressly provided that he shall not be removed except in case of inefficiency or for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. It will be persuasive and, I think, controlling, and it can not be changed by future Congresses except by a bill or joint resolution, which would require the approval of the President. I hope the amendment which has been offered will be voted down.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this section close at the end of 10 minutes. I understand the gentleman from South Carolina has another amendment.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir; my amendment is being discussed in connection with this.

Mr. GOOD. I will see that the gentleman gets time on his amendment.

Mr. CANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have five minutes.

Mr. GOOD. I will make it 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa asks unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment close in 15 minutes. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, as I construe the language of this section the Congress will be practically without any way by which the comptroller general or his assistant may be removed before he reaches the age of 70 years. I do not know whether a future Congress will be so afraid of itself that it would not like to have some right of removal with regard to these officials. But the power should be retained, and if they do not want it they will not be bound to exercise it. However, it seems to me that this Congress ought not to attempt to tie the hands of those who are to come after us by fastening officials of this sort upon the Government practically for life, or, at least, without any practical method by which the Congress may get rid of him.

Now, let us see how this statute will operate. It does not provide that the Congress may remove the comptroller general or his assistant at will. But the act limits the way in which he may be removed. One of the causes is "inefficiency," another is "neglect of duty," and the other is "malfeasance in office"; and the act provides specifically that neither the comptroller general nor his assistant shall be removed for any other cause.

Now, I take it that the purpose of this act is to put men in these positions who will use their brains and energies in the effort to inaugurate and maintain economy in the expenditures of the various departments of the Government. Well, my friends, the question of "malfeasance in office" would not have any relation to a man's tendency toward economy or extravagance. The same is true as to making "neglect of duty" the cause of removal and the same as to "inefficiency." A man might be ever so efficient according to any legal interpretation of the term, but he might be one of those men like our beloved friend Mr. CANNON mentioned a day or two ago. He might be a man with a vision, and the distinguished gentleman from Illinois said that a man with a vision is generally a visionary. He might be ever so efficient, but at the same time be one of those men who has no idea of practical economy in the matter of spending money for the public welfare. But yet when he gets in, what can the Congress do except to let him stay or bring him up here, after notice and hearings, and give

him a trial on the question of whether or not he has been "inefficient" or "neglected his duty" or been "guilty of malfeasance" in office? He might be the most liberal-minded man in regard to the expenditures of money that was ever connected with the Government, but Congress would have no remedy, and he would be in office for life.

Mr. CLEARY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEAGALL. I will.

Mr. CLEARY. Does the President appoint any other official besides this whom he does not have the power to remove?

Mr. STEAGALL. The judges.

Mr. CLEARY. Regarding the matter of Congress being the judge of his capacity as to his malfeasance in office, do you not believe that if there was a hostile Congress they would easily charge these things, whether he was guilty or not, if they were fighting the President?

Mr. STEAGALL. That would be easily charged; but under this act he would have a right to be heard, and it would involve a regular trial before both Houses of Congress, and the Lord only knows how long it would take under the provisions of this act before they would ever be able to get rid of him. They do not retain the power to discharge or remove because of failure to economize, yet the enforcement of economy is the controlling purpose of this act. And if it passes—which I hope it will not, especially with the life-tenure provision which it now carries—certainly the Congress ought to strike out the hampering provisions of the act and retain the right to deal with these officials in case of failure on their part to take proper steps to enforce reforms and economy. [Applause.]

Mr. CANDLER. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. CANDLER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the amendment offered by the distinguished gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CLARK], if adopted, would give the President of the United States power in his discretion to remove this officer—the proposed comptroller general—whenever he believed the interests of the Government required it. The gentleman from Tennessee, my distinguished friend Mr. BYRNS, says that that power ought not to be given to the President, because it is the purpose by the provisions of this bill to eliminate entirely from the control of the President of the United States anything in reference to this high and exalted position and the distinguished person who may be appointed to discharge its duties.

Now, gentlemen, the President of the United States takes a solemn oath, when he enters upon the discharge of his duties, to support the Constitution and to execute the laws of the land. The gentleman from Tennessee says that this officer under this bill would have the right to construe the laws, to make recommendations in reference to them, and to submit proposed matters of legislation relating to the receipts and disbursements of public funds and audit the accounts. The President of the United States is the servant of the people of this country. No matter how high a position a man may hold in this Republic, he is still the servant of the people and responsible to the people, and ought to be, because it is through the ballots of the people that he is placed in the position he occupies. [Applause.] Then when the President of these United States, in obedience to the call of the people expressed by their ballots, assumes the duties of his high and exalted position, the greatest office in the world, he is still responsible to them, and he is the head of this Government and is charged with the execution of the laws and with the enforcement of the Constitution.

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. The gentleman knows that now the Comptroller of the Treasury construes the statutes with reference to appropriations, and that there is no appeal whatever from his decision?

Mr. CANDLER. Yes; and the President of the United States has the right, in his discretion, to remove him. And I contend he ought to have a right to remove this officer if he fails to discharge the duties of his office acceptably to the President—the executive head of his Government who appoints him and is responsible for him.

Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee. It transfers the right of removal from the President to the Congress, the body that makes the appropriation, and we are charged with the responsibility to see that his duties are carried out.

Mr. CANDLER. Yes; and by doing so, instead of taking the position out of politics, it puts it in the method of politics. If this amendment of the gentleman from Missouri is adopted, it will not only give the President the right to remove this officer, but the provision of the bill will also remain which gives the Congress the right to remove him by concurrent resolution, if they see proper to do so, and that will be a double security that he will be required to perform his duties faithfully and effi-



ciently and in the interest of the people and for the good of the country. We all know what difficulty there would be to secure his removal by the Congress of the United States, by joint action of both Houses. We know the difficulty always encountered in removing a Federal judge. The chairman of the committee [Mr. Goon] states that this provision in reference to the tenure of office of this officer is taken from the statute authorizing the appointment of United States judges, fixing their tenure of office, and providing for their retirement. I have seen since I have been a Member of Congress the serious difficulty there is in removing a judge of the United States court, regardless of what his conduct may have been, and very few have ever been removed in the history of this Republic. And just as it is very difficult to remove a United States judge, it would be very much more intricate and difficult to remove this officer by the joint action of the two Houses of Congress. In the case of an effort to remove a United States judge the House of Representatives prefers articles of impeachment, and the Senate of the United States tries the case as a jury, and by their votes determine his guilt or innocence and whether he shall be removed or not. Under this bill you give the right to this officer to have a trial before both Houses of Congress, their verdict to be rendered and enforced by concurrent resolution, to be passed by both the House and the Senate, and in such a case you would have 435 jurors in this House and 96 jurors in the Senate, and to have a hearing and trial and decision by them would be a never-ending proceeding, saturated with politics, in all probability, of the most partisan character. You who have seen election cases tried here know something of the politics and bitterness which would get into a trial of a comptroller general if one was ever tried by Congress in an effort to remove him. You might get a comptroller general who was or might become inimical to the President or unreasonable and bitter toward his administration of who was corrupt or very extravagant and wasteful.

Even the President or anybody else sometimes makes mistakes in the appointment of officers, and if you should get that character of a man in this office he might so construe or administer the laws or be so extravagant or corrupt or unreasonable in his recommendations or become so partisan himself as to bring discredit on the President of the United States, who had sworn to execute the law and uphold the Constitution, and if you fail to adopt this amendment then you would say to the President under such a condition, "Your hands are tied hard and fast, and you can not take any action in reference to an officer of that kind, and you can not remove him, although you are responsible for him." You do not want to put any man who is big enough for the people to elect President in that kind of a situation, do you?

Then, again, the theory of this Government is opposed absolutely to a life tenure of office, and I am opposed to it. I am opposed to United States judges having a life tenure of office. [Applause.] I think it would be better to bring them closer to their responsibility to the people by giving them a reasonable tenure of office rather than a life tenure. If they faithfully and efficiently and with justice administered the duties of their office they could, and no doubt would, be reappointed, or if it could be left to the people they could be reelected. I believe the best government is a government by and of the people, and therefore I believe all officers ought to come before the people, as we come before them, at the end of a definite period of time and receive their approval or disapproval, for at last, in the final analysis, it is to the people in a Republic like ours that all the officers of the Government are and should be responsible. [Applause.] So much for that. Now, permit me just a few words as to the bill generally. You Members with whom I daily so pleasantly associate know that during my service as a Member here I have stood for economy. It is believed this bill will bring about economy—save money for the people. Therefore I shall vote for it on its final passage.

What we need to-day is real economy, economy in governmental affairs and economy in the business world and economy in the private affairs of the citizen. If strict economy was observed in Government, in business, and private affairs, it would contribute much to remedy the extravagant tendencies of the present times, which are at least to some extent responsible for the repeated cry about the high cost of living. The cost of living is high, and it ought to be and I hope can and will be reduced; but the cost of "high living" is extravagantly high, and if these extravagances of "high living" could and would be eliminated that would tend considerably to reduce the "high cost of living." It is time to begin not only to preach but to practice economy in Government and economy in everyday life. In and out of Congress we hear appeals for economy in Government expenses. There is room for it. War-time expenditures

were often on an extravagant basis because results had to be obtained regardless of the cost. All of us, Democrats and Republicans, voted for those appropriations, and both political parties are responsible for them. We did not have time to fully investigate. Our country, the security of our institutions, and the sanctity and protection of our homes were at stake. We could not know what amount of money was absolutely necessary, and we all voted for a plenty so as to be on the safe side and to be sure to furnish enough to meet every necessity required to win the war, and we won it. That money is spent and gone.

It will do no good to criticize and grumble and complain about it. That will not get any of the money back into the Treasury. Therefore the frequent effort of our Republican friends to criticize and blame the Democratic administration for expenditures of war times for which they voted will do no good and get none of the money back. The congressional junketing here and overseas, investigating for partisan and political purposes, will not get any money back. It only increases expenditures by the useless waste of many thousands of dollars more, thereby adding that much more to the cost incident to the war. We had as well quit looking backward and courageously meet the problems now before us. Let us as rapidly as possible get back to normal conditions, repeal all unnecessary laws, and reduce expenses. I am an old-fashioned, unfriiled Democrat. I do not believe any more taxes ought to be collected from the people than are necessary to pay the expenses of the Government economically administered. I want to see taxes reduced now just as soon as possible. You can not reduce taxes, however, unless you reduce expenditures, and you can not reduce expenditures unless you practice strict economy. What is needed in order that we may economize is a standardized, businesslike method of making appropriations. When appropriations are made, know in advance that the money is available to pay them; and, if it is not, know at least where it is to come from to meet the expenditures when authorized. This budget bill under consideration proposes a method by which an effort, at least, is to be made to do business according to business methods, and I shall vote for it. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. TEMPLE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to call attention to two points very briefly. The statement has been made that nobody knows what the powers of the comptroller general are. They are very definitely stated in sections 10 and 13 of this act. Section 10 declares—

That all powers and duties now conferred or imposed by law upon the Comptroller of the Treasury or upon the Auditor for the Treasury Department, the Auditor for the War Department, the Auditor for the Interior Department, the Auditor for the Navy Department, the Auditor for the State and Other Departments, or the Auditor for the Post Office Department shall, so far as not inconsistent with this act, be vested in and imposed upon the accounting department and be exercised without direction from any other officer, and the balances certified by the comptroller general shall be final and conclusive upon the executive branch of the Government.

Section 13 provides, in addition—

That the comptroller general shall investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds, and shall make to Congress, at the beginning of each regular session, a report in writing of the work of the accounting department.

That section covers additions to his powers beyond the powers now held by the Comptroller of the Treasury. His powers are very definite.

Now, as to the question of his removal by the President. The whole purpose of creating an accounting department outside of the Treasury Department, where the accounting department is now, is that we may have an independent audit, that the audit shall be made by an officer who shall not be subject to one of the spending agencies whose account he audits. The President as the Chief Executive has control of the administrative work and gives orders to the administrative officers. The Congress makes the appropriations which are spent by these administrative agents of the Government. The report of the comptroller general should be made to the power which makes the appropriations. The Constitution makes the House of Representatives particularly the originating power. We have control of the purse, and the Executive has no control of any money except moneys appropriated by Congress. The report should be made to the appropriating power; and the auditing power, it seems to me, with its judicial functions considered especially, should be as independent of the executive power as are other officers exercising judicial functions. The President of the United States has no right to remove a Justice of the Supreme Court or any other judge. Why should he have the right to remove the man who exercises judicial functions in interpreting the appropriating acts of Congress? The control should lie with

the appropriating power, and the passage of the amendment now pending would divide that control, would give the President power to remove and at the same time it would retain in Congress the power to remove.

Now, as to the question of impeachment.

Mr. REED of West Virginia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield before he leaves that point?

Mr. TEMPLE. Just for a question.

Mr. REED of West Virginia. Will this law do away with these offices of auditors of the various departments?

Mr. TEMPLE. It will transfer them, so that they will go with the accounting department and be removed from the Treasury Department.

Mr. REED of West Virginia. In all the departments, including the Post Office Department?

Mr. TEMPLE. None of these auditors is in any department excepting the Treasury Department. The Auditor for the War Department and the Auditor for the Navy Department are not connected with the War and Navy Departments. They are connected with the Treasury Department only. So with the other auditors. They are not auditors in the department for which they audit. They are in the Treasury Department.

Mr. REED of West Virginia. The bill contemplates the transfer of those?

Mr. TEMPLE. Yes; taking them along with the comptroller general.

Now, as to the question of impeachment. That question never would arise. Congress, being able to remove the comptroller general by concurrent resolution, would never deny to itself the power to remove him by impeachment. If we can do it by a majority vote, Congress would not put up against that plan the plan of removing him by a two-thirds vote. There would be no quarrel within Congress on that point, although I do think that the gentleman's amendment would do absolutely no harm to the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CLARK].

The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

Mr. BLANTON. A division, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. A division is demanded.

The committee divided; and there were—yeas 13, yeas 60.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers. The gentleman from Missouri has just stepped out of the Hall.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas demands tellers.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, I will withdraw the request.

The CHAIRMAN. The request is withdrawn.

So the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. STEVENSON] offers an amendment which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. STEVENSON: Page 7, line 23, after the word "manner," strike out the period and insert the words "except by impeachment."

Mr. GOOD. There is a period after the word "impeachment"?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GOOD. I accept the amendment.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not desire to make any extended remarks on this amendment, but a good deal of criticism has been directed to the amendment by some of my colleagues here. There is no question but that Congress can create an office and create a method of removal from the office in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution, but it can not create a method different from constitutional methods and say there shall be no other. That is the reason why I am offering this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman, may we have the amendment reported?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will report the amendment of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. STEVENSON].

The amendment was again read.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Page 7, line 17, strike out all of line 17 down to the word "may."

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, this amendment adopted, with those previously adopted, would leave the comptroller general in the same status that he has now, holding a continuing commission, running at the pleasure of the authority that might remove him from office. This covers the matter completely, so far as amendments may be concerned, to perpetuate this condition and leave the transfer on that basis. I have nothing further to add. I shall be glad to have a vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio offers an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GARD as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska: Page 7, line 17, after the word "office," strike out "during good behavior" and insert "for a term of six years," and strike out all the rest of the language in lines 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26.

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman, in common with everyone who has given any study to our system of appropriations, I favor the inauguration of some budgetary system; but in that favor I would not create a body which could—

Bestride the narrow world like a Colossus.

Nor would I increase unduly the officers who hold their positions during their natural lives. As a general proposition I am opposed to creating any more positions to be held during good behavior, which is nearly always equivalent to saying during their natural lives, and then having them come in under some retirement bill, so that we not alone may have a system no more efficient than if elective or appointed for a term, but pay the officials, when they get to be a certain age, because they have become inefficient.

The amendment I have in mind changes the term "during good behavior" to the language "for a term of six years," it being my idea that these positions of comptroller general and assistant comptroller general of the budgetary system could be carried into best effect not by appointing somebody for life but for this period of six years. It has occurred to me that possibly we should get the best results from the chief magistracy of the Nation by making the term six years and providing that the President should be ineligible for reelection. But I am opposed to the creation of additional offices such as this for a life tenure, when the period of six years is certainly ample and sufficient to give this budgetary system the benefit of that which is the best in a man's make-up.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. GARD. Yes; I yield.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Did I understand the gentleman correctly to say that we are creating a new position and thereby increasing the number of offices?

Mr. GARD. I did not say anything about that. I said I was opposed to the creation of new positions with life tenure. That is the idea I tried to convey to the gentleman.

Now, we all know that in the history of the great Appropriations Committee of the House a man whose memory we all hold in high esteem, the late Mr. Courts, held the clerkship of that committee for many years. And there would not be the slightest intention, I am sure, to take away the splendid service of the gentleman who has succeeded him. But these things go along because men prove their worth and do not continue because we invest the positions with a life tenure. When we say that the comptroller general and assistant comptroller general shall hold their positions for six years it seems to me we do what it is desirable to do. We take them out of politics. We give them a fixed and definite term. If they are good and efficient public servants the President of the United States—any President who has the best interests of the country at heart—may reappoint them.

Mr. HARDY of Texas. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. GARD. Surely.

Mr. HARDY of Texas. In making this a life-tenure office, do you not remove the strongest incentive that an appointee has to be efficient and faithful and fully effective as a public servant?

Mr. GARD. I think so. I think the more life-tenure positions we make the poorer will be our public service.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

Mr. GOOD. I ask unanimous consent that debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa asks unanimous consent that debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in five minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that either of these amendments ought to prevail. I believe you must give a tenure to this office that will invite men of ability to accept it. The proposition offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARD] to appoint the comptroller general for a period of six years without the right of removal, it seems to me, can not be defended from any standpoint. By the creation of this department it is intended to make it thoroughly independent of the executive departments. The gentleman's amendment if adopted absolutely reverses the whole plan of the bill and instead of having a budgetary system with a comptroller general to audit and control the accounts of the Government fearlessly and to do his work efficiently, we substitute for that a man who would hold his office not because of his ability but because of his political service.

That is the plan we are trying to get away from, and that has been the evil in our present plan. Unless you throw around the comptroller general all the safeguards that will make him absolutely independent and make those whom he appoints independent and fearless, I fear we will find the same condition existing that inheres in the present system; that is, that your auditors and the comptroller general dare not criticize an executive official. They can not become independent in action. The provision here is that the comptroller general shall hold his office during good behavior. That provision was placed in the Constitution of the United States so far as it related to judicial positions under the United States. This position is in many respects similar to those judicial positions. It is semi-judicial, and we should throw around it all the safeguards that the Constitution guarantees to Federal judges; that is, that they shall hold their office during good behavior. Place that provision in the law and the comptroller general can how to the mark. He can pass upon requests for appropriations in a fearless manner, just as a Federal judge passes upon questions of law that come before him.

Mr. BLAND of Missouri. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. GOOD. Certainly.

Mr. BLAND of Missouri. Did not the committee contemplate that the comptroller general might not only be brought into conflict with the executive department and with the executive branches of the Government, but sometimes with one side or the other of the aisle in Congress, and possibly both sides, in the impartial discharge of his duties?

Mr. GOOD. Absolutely. That department ought to be independent and fearless to criticize wrong expenditures of money wherever it finds them. It ought to criticize inefficiency in every executive department where inefficiency exists, and one of the troubles with our present system is that the auditors dare not criticize. If they criticize, their political heads will come off.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the provisions of the bill have been pretty clearly thought out along that line, and so far as the tenure of office is concerned it ought to remain as the committee has reported it.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the substitute offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARD].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. BLANTON) there were 9 ayes and 49 noes.

So the substitute to the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question now is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. ANDREWS].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. BLANTON) there were 8 ayes and 43 noes.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I offer another amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 7, line 10, strike out the figures "\$10,000" and insert the figures "\$7,500."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. BLANTON) there were 4 ayes and 47 noes.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. BRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 7, line 22, after the word "office," insert "or, of any crime or conduct involving moral turpitude."

Mr. BRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment only adds to the causes for removal, crime, and that conduct known generally as involving moral turpitude. I am in favor of the bill and in favor of the budget. I think it means a saving to the country of millions of dollars. It means economy in administration. This amendment provides that if the comptroller general or his assistant is guilty of a crime or conduct imputed or hostile to the best interests of the Government a concurrent resolution of Congress would reach and remove him. I understand the chairman of the committee has no objection to it.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether the amendment would accomplish any good or not. I do not see how it would do any harm. I have no objection to it.

Mr. BRIGGS. The need for legislation of this character has long been apparent to those who have given thoughtful consideration to the best method of reducing waste, extravagance, and inefficiency in the administration of the Government. It is probably too much to hope that all loss from these causes can be entirely eliminated, but it is unquestionably true that it is possible for vast sums of money to be recklessly and extravagantly expended under the old, inadequate systems and which, under the budget plan, can be saved the taxpayers of the country. Both Democratic and Republican Parties have recognized the necessity for the budget and have both declared in their national platforms in favor of legislation providing for the same. The President has recommended it, and the public generally favor it. It is in response to this demand of the people and to the evident necessity for the creation of a proper system of checks and balances if economics demanded and required are to be effected that both the Democrats and Republicans of the House have advocated and united in the support of this bill.

The present measure, which has been unanimously reported out of the committee, contains the vital elements of a true budget plan; that is, it provides:

1. For the creation of a bureau of the budget in the office of the President.

2. Makes it the duty of such bureau to assist the President in the performance of the powers conferred upon him by the act.

3. Directs that the bureau shall also make a careful investigation of all provisions of law dealing in any way with the preparation and transmission to Congress of estimates and the preparation and submission to Congress of financial data of any character in order to determine what changes should be made in such provisions of law, to the end that all requirements in respect to the reporting to Congress of financial data and estimates shall be brought together in one place, coordinated, revised, and brought into harmony with an alternative budget which the President is also required to submit to Congress. The result of such investigation shall be embodied in a report or reports to the President, who may transmit to Congress such report or reports, or any part thereof, with such recommendations regarding the action which in his opinion should be taken upon the matters conveyed by such report.

4. That on a date to be fixed by the President the heads of the several executive departments shall annually submit to the President their estimates of the needs of such departments.

5. On the first day of each regular session after the calendar year 1919 a document, to be known as the budget, shall be transmitted by the President to Congress, which document shall contain:

(a) Balanced statements of the revenues and expenditures of the Government for the preceding fiscal year, and of the resources and liabilities of the Treasury at the close of the year.

(b) His estimates of the revenues and expenditures of the Government for the current fiscal year, and of the resources and liabilities of the Treasury at the close of the year.

(c) His estimates of the revenues and expenditure needs of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year, and how, in his opinion, these needs should be met. The President shall also transmit with such budget such further data regarding the financial affairs of the Government and such recommendations as he may deem proper.

6. An alternative budget is also required to be submitted by the President in substantially the same form as the budget.

7. That after June 30, 1920, no estimate or request for any appropriation, and no recommendation as to how the revenue needs of the Government should be met, shall be submitted to Congress by any officer of the executive branch of the Government, except the President, unless at the request of either House of Congress.

8. The bill further provides for an accounting department, which shall be an establishment of the Government independent of the executive department and under the control and direction of the comptroller general of the United States. The office of the Comptroller of the Treasury is abolished and all such employees transferred to the office of the comptroller general. It is provided that this official shall hold office during good behavior, but may be removed at any time by concurrent resolution of Congress, after notice and hearing, when, in its judgment, the comptroller general or his assistant has been inefficient or guilty of neglect of duty or of malfeasance in office or, with the amendment which I have offered, of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, as well as by impeachment. This practically gives the comptroller general the same independence and immunity from partisan political control as is now enjoyed by the employees of the Government in civil service, and will enable him to discharge the duties of his office without fear or favor in spite of incurring the displeasure in powerful quarters of those whose policies or desires for expenditures are limited by the restraints which he, under the law, must impose.

But notwithstanding the opportunity accorded to the comptroller general to exercise fearlessly and fully the power vested in him to supervise the expenditures of the Government, he is yet made answerable to Congress for failure to discharge his duties, or for a wrongful exercise of any of his powers, as well as for an inefficient exercise of those powers and duties; and by the amendment which I have offered it is further provided that Congress may by a concurrent resolution remove him if he should become guilty of any felony or of any conduct involving moral turpitude.

There might arise instances of unfitness not serious enough to be classed as a felony, but which would be within the meaning of the language "conduct involving moral turpitude."

9. The comptroller general is vested with all the powers and duties now imposed by law upon the Comptroller of the Treasury or upon the auditors for the different executive departments, and the offices of such last-named officials are abolished.

It is also provided that the comptroller general shall investigate all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds and shall make to Congress, at the beginning of each regular session, a report in writing of the work of the accounting department, containing recommendations concerning the legislation he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition and settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public money as he may think advisable.

He is also granted the right to examine any books or other papers of any department or other Government agency.

Such, in substance, are the provisions of the bill.

Through its operation thus is:

1. A centralized responsibility imposed upon the Chief Executive of the Nation for the conduct of the administrative branch of the Government.

2. A statement furnished in complete form of all the revenues and expenditures for the preceding year, with also those for the current year and for the ensuing year, with a further statement of the resources and liabilities of the Treasury at the close of each such year.

3. And through the audit, investigation, supervision, and recommendations of the comptroller general, it ought to be possible to clearly present to Congress just in what branches of the Government duplication of work and effort, as well as waste and extravagance, exist, and the best methods of eliminating same.

Moreover, Congress will be more fully advised of the income of the Government, as well as of its needs, and will thereby be better enabled than it has ever been before to adjust the two and reduce taxation and expenditure where it can be done, avoiding in a great measure, if not completely, the deficiency appropriations which have for so long been the custom and practice in our Government.

At the present time the national debt of the United States amounts to the stupendous sum of approximately \$25,000,000,000. A staggering debt, indeed, but not so great comparatively as the war debts of other countries who do not have the national wealth of \$230,000,000,000 possessed by this Nation. But the debt is heavy enough, and so great that to pay the interest alone on it requires the enormous sum of more than \$1,000,000,000.

It has been computed that for the period from April, 1917, when the United States entered the war, to April, 1919, a period of 25 months, the war cost this country about \$22,000,000,000, or at the rate of \$1,000,000 an hour, and making, on the average, a charge of \$200 a person for the 110,000,000 people in the United States. This cost does not include the great sums given the Red Cross and other war-work agencies.

In addition, nearly \$10,000,000,000 was loaned the allied nations. When this amount will be repaid no one now can say.

The war has practically ended, but war costs have not. Not only the people in their daily farming, industrial, and home life feel it, but the Government also is having to pay substantially the same relatively high costs for what it is compelled to have and do, and therefore, like the people, finds for the most part that the dollar now which it spends will scarcely go half as far as it did previous to the beginning of the war. This condition in turn has been reflected not only in the costs of materials, but in the necessities of employees of the Government, who are constantly pressing and urging upon Congress the need of increased salaries and wages to meet the alarming advance in the cost of living.

So that the appropriations for the conduct and operation of the Government are necessarily greater than they used to be for only the same return which it used to be possible to obtain for so much less.

Congress is making the greatest effort to check and reduce that cost, and has already adopted the most stringent measures to punish hoarders and profiteers, whose greed rises supreme above the welfare and, in some cases, to the very right to existence of their fellow countrymen. Such acts have been made offenses punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and if grand juries and petit juries will indict and convict these profiteers some substantial relief from the practices of these offenders may speedily be afforded.

The continuance of the cost of the war, however, is not alone centered in the high cost of living, but must be recognized and further borne in the provision that must be made for the soldiers, sailors, and marines who gave and risked their lives that their countrymen and this Republic might continue to live and give to all mankind the example and security of a free people under the greatest constitutional and most enduring form of government. Already war-risk insurance, compensation, vocational education, and allowances to the soldiers, sailors, and marines and their dependents require the appropriation of many millions of dollars.

Notwithstanding a tremendous cutting down of appropriations for the current year and a reduction in appropriations of billions of dollars by reason of the signing of the armistice and the saving of vast amounts appropriated for carrying on the war, there is required for this year alone, according to the estimates of the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, over ten and a half billion dollars, with only total revenues of about seven billion and a quarter with which to meet them. In other words, it appears necessary to raise in some way more than three billion and a half dollars additional to meet the current requirements, unless they can be reduced in some way which has not yet been made apparent.

The war, of course, required tremendous expenditures, but it was won, and the price of victory will be ungrudgingly paid by the American people. It can not, however, but be felt for a long, long time. Congress should, however, make every effort to dispense with unnecessary expenditures and avail itself of every agency which will not only save the people from further burdens and taxation, but, wherever possible, contribute to the reduction of those that exist. This the budget system in some measure promises to accomplish; therefore its establishment should and will no doubt be welcomed by every taxpayer in the land.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 10. That all powers and duties now conferred or imposed by law upon the Comptroller of the Treasury or upon the Auditor for the Treasury Department, the Auditor for the War Department, the Auditor for the Interior Department, the Auditor for the Navy Department, the Auditor for the State and Other Departments, or the Auditor for the Post Office Department shall, so far as not inconsistent with this act, be vested in and imposed upon the accounting department and be exercised without direction from any other officer, and the balances certified by the comptroller general shall be final and conclusive upon the executive branch of the Government. The revision by the comptroller general of settlements made by the six auditors referred to in this section shall be discontinued, except as to settlements made before July 1, 1920.

Section 283 of the Revised Statutes is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 286. All claims and demands whatever by the United States or against them, and all accounts whatever in which the United States are concerned, either as debtors or creditors, shall be settled and adjusted by the accounting department."

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa asks unanimous consent that he may proceed for 10 minutes. Is there objection? There was no objection.



Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I shall support this bill. While I am not as sanguine about saving millions of dollars, or any very large sum, as some gentlemen who have spoken, yet I believe it will effect economy in some directions, do away with some abuses, and fix to some extent the responsibility for expenditures.

There has been, I think, more misunderstanding with reference to a budget system in the country at large than with reference to any other question that has been before Congress. That is largely due to the extensive propaganda that has been carried on endeavoring to show that Congress was not doing its duty, and had no system of supervising accounts in this Government worth mentioning. Most of the writers and many of the witnesses that came before the committee which prepared the bill, as will be shown by the hearings, seem to have the idea that the British system is highly successful and highly popular. As a matter of fact, it is neither successful nor is it popular in England. The system which now prevails in this country at the present time, with whatever defects it may have, is vastly better than the system that prevails in Great Britain, and it is so acknowledged.

In this connection I want to correct another prevailing belief, and that is that the budget system is a cure for all the financial evils that affect our Government. It is not. It will palliate those evils. It will tend to prevent waste, but it will not strike at the greatest source of expenditures.

The expenditures of a government depend principally upon its policies and the methods by which those policies are carried out. With neither of these questions does a budget deal, except incidentally, and it touches the efficiency of government management remotely if at all. For example, the expenses of our Army and Navy depend principally upon the policy which we adopt as to whether we will have a great Army and a great Navy or only one of moderate size. They also depend on whether the Army and Navy affairs are carried on efficiently and without waste. For example, we have great numbers of automobiles and automobile trucks rusting away and being ruined because the Government has taken no steps to sell them; in fact, has refused to sell them, although it has admitted that it never will use them. So also we have a large number of vessels in the Navy being operated which ought to be junked in the same manner as England junked 150 vessels in her navy, and made a great saving thereby. But the budget system does not touch a matter of this kind. The expenses of the Agricultural Department depend largely as to whether it shall have an army of agents in various parts of the country for various purposes or whether, on the other hand, its operations shall be restricted. With such matters the budget has nothing to do. In fact, the wildest extravagance may prevail under the best budget system, and some budget plans will, as I shall hereafter show, rather tend to increase expenses than to reduce them. A large number of States have adopted a budget system, but those who have adopted a budget system are not conspicuous for economy, as a rule, and some of them are noted for the extent of their expenditures. In some of these States it has been brought about in the same manner as much of our Federal governmental expense has been caused, namely, by a multiplication of boards and commissions, which I fought about a multiplication of officials and clerks. We have at Washington far more clerks than is necessary. In some departments I am satisfied that the number could be reduced one-third if the management of these departments was conducted with any degree of efficiency. But this will not be corrected by the adoption of a budget system, as is abundantly shown by the experience of such countries as England.

I want to return for a moment to the much-heralded and much-approved budget system of England. A large number of writers on this subject, and especially the author of one book that has been much quoted, regard this system as a model. Many of the witnesses that appeared before the Budget Committee seemed to have the same opinion, thereby showing their utter ignorance of the subject upon which they thought themselves competent to give Congress advice. Yet the London Times has described this system as the "road to ruin" and the English papers are filled with articles on the extravagance of the Government under its budget system. Public indignation in England has risen to such an extent that the Government has been compelled to abandon some of its extravagant schemes and policies in order to quiet the universal clamor against its extravagance. The Government, in fact, under the English budget system, makes no pretense of matching its expenditures with its revenues; and the London Economist has said that its course would "ultimately land the country in insolvency."

What has caused the failure of the English system and what is it that the English people now want? The fact is that under

the English system the budget is made up by the ministry. It has one good feature about it, and that is that it prescribes a limit to the expenditures, but unfortunately this limitation does not rest upon the ministry that prepares the budget, and consequently it may be as extravagant as it wishes without any check, for, as a matter of actual practice, Parliament can not reduce the expenditures below the amount of the budget prepared by the ministry. The various items of the budget are not gone over by separate committees which work upon them for months as in this country. The details are not scrutinized by special committees, and there is no open discussion worthy of the name of the budget, for the reason that the details are never considered in Parliament as they are in our Congress, where the appropriation bills are read paragraph by paragraph, discussed, and amended after the special committees have done their best to perfect them. Under the method adopted in England the items are not first subjected to the scrutiny of special committees, and under their form of government a refusal to approve the budget would mean the fall of the ministry, necessitating either the formation of a new ministry or a dissolution of Parliament and a new election. The result has been that in the last 25 years there has not been any material change in the budget made in Parliament, and to use the words of the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Hawley], Parliament has become merely a rubber stamp by which approval might be given to the budget. At the same time not a single budget has ever been submitted but what contained items of expenditure which in some cases, particularly in the last year, involved immense sums which never would have been approved if examined by a proper committee, and never could have secured the approval of Parliament if a vote could be had thereon based upon the merits of the proposition alone. As a consequence, a select committee, which was appointed by Parliament for the purpose of budget reform in England, and the most eminent writers in that country who have considered the subject, are universally in favor of adopting the leading features of the American system, believing that their adoption would, without any doubt, greatly reduce the expenditures of Great Britain.

An extensive propaganda has been carried on in this country for the purpose of making the people at large believe that Congress was chargeable with the extravagance which has prevailed in our governmental affairs, and, unfortunately, this propaganda has been very successful. Nothing could be further from the real fact. Congress is constantly engaged in a struggle with the various departments to keep down expenses. Every department chief, no matter what his politics, desires to extend the activities of his department and to multiply the number of his subordinates. He considers his particular department as one of the most important and necessary of all the various divisions of our Government operations, and to a certain extent this is creditable to him, but it invariably results in increased demands upon the Public Treasury, and often in an increased personnel for which there is no necessity. The estimates brought in by the various heads of the departments as necessary for their operation are invariably greatly reduced by Congress. It is often said that larger estimates are brought in than is necessary, because the department heads feel that Congress will reduce them anyway. It is true, although contrary to public belief, that the usual tendency of Congress is toward economy, but the department heads always have a full opportunity to show through their experts just what they need, and are never satisfied with what is given them. They appeal from the decision of the House to the Senate, where, as a rule, they get the appropriations raised, although not to the extent that they desire. In many instances, as every Member of Congress knows, they have instituted a propaganda over the country in support of provisions which would allow them to engage in new activities and new expenditures, and have even gone so far as to attempt to build up a "back fire" among the people at home against Congressmen who were not inclined to grant what they wished. The long and short of the whole matter is that a budget framed by the spending departments, which in this country constitutes the administration, will always be extravagant, and the extravagance of our present Government is largely owing to the fact that although Congress has endeavored to keep the expenditures down, the insistence of the departments and the administration has had its weight and effect.

At this point I wish to call your attention to one feature which I deem a weakness in the present bill. I would have much preferred that this budget should have been framed by Congress in the first instance and not by any budget bureau, as constituted by the bill, which I very much fear would be too much under the influence of the various heads of the departments and the administration in general. If in fact it should be controlled by them, the result will not make for economy, but

the reverse. It will be observed that the officers and heads of this system are to be appointed by the President in the first instance. True, the auditor created by this bill may be removed by Congress only, and to that extent he is independent of the administration, but there is a similar officer under the English system with equally extensive powers and it has been found that after all he is simply an accounting officer and does not undertake to do more than to pass upon the legality of the expenditures. I am unable to see how he will be in a position to do more. He is not given any authority to investigate, and although he may have under this bill the authority to criticize, I doubt very much his being able to definitely ascertain and prove the facts upon which such criticism should be based.

But while this bill does not in this respect meet my approval, I shall vote for it on account of its having been supported by the unanimous report of the Budget Committee, and I am willing to take it and look to the future for evidence of how it will work out. If it works well, the system will be preserved, but the committee which brought it before us practically concedes that it needs other legislation to supplement it in order to give the budget system the effect desired.

As a supplement to this bill the Budget Committee has reported a resolution which is intended to effectuate and carry out its objects. This resolution, I anticipate, will meet with more opposition than the bill which we are now considering. While it is not now before the House, it is worth while to give it some attention in advance, for unless the provisions of the present bill are supplemented by further action of Congress it will not, in my opinion, have any great effect.

This resolution provides for one single appropriating committee to take the place of all the appropriating committees which we now have, so far as their power to make appropriations is concerned. In my judgment the resolution ought not to be adopted without modifications. I do not believe it is possible for one appropriating committee to perform all the duties which are now performed by the 10 great committees which now make appropriations. I can not understand where or how they will get time to discuss estimates in detail or to master completely the various subjects that would be brought before it. I do not know how it could obtain the knowledge in detail which the members of these several committees now have with reference to the activities of the departments with which they are respectively concerned, and I am very sure that it would have no opportunity in the multitude of matters that would come before it to institute the inquiries and carry on the investigations necessary to obtain the information which such a committee ought to have to properly perform its duties. I think, however, that with an amendment to this resolution it might be made acceptable to the House and used with great benefit. When it is brought up for action thereon I shall offer an amendment providing in substance that instead of this large committee being in charge of all of the details of the appropriations it shall be simply an allocating and limiting committee with reference to the appropriations.

Its functions will be to fix the total amount which may be expended for all governmental purposes during the fiscal year and to allot the proportion thereof which may be appropriate by each committee. It would, in short, be a congressional budget committee, which revised the estimates of the budget bureau, both for the whole Government and for the separate departments. The details as to how these several amounts allocated to each committee should be expended would be left to the various appropriating committees, as now, who would be, in my judgment, better prepared and unquestionably would have far more time to devote to the details than if this one committee undertook to perform all this work. For the purpose of performing its work this budget committee of the House—for I would have it a budget committee and not an appropriating committee—would have before it all of the estimates and information furnished by the budget bureau, so that it could act quickly. Its failure, however, to act quickly would not prevent the appropriating committees from going on with their work in the usual manner.

This plan would have all of the benefits proposed by this resolution as it now stands, and it would have the immeasurable advantages of having every detail of the appropriation scanned in a manner which would be quite impossible if this duty was undertaken by a single committee, with still further opportunity for reductions in the appropriations, if possible.

The resolution providing for the appointment of a committee of 35 members to make all appropriations presents a far-reaching measure. It takes away from those who have hitherto spent months and in many cases years in familiarizing themselves with every phase of our appropriations in the past their

most important powers, and all that would be left to them would be the power to authorize appropriations, not knowing whether they would be granted. The real determination of the policies of Congress would rest with this great appropriating committee, which would finally determine whether the appropriations authorized should be made.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Is it not true that the committees familiar with the subject matters would authorize all of the appropriations and that the appropriations would be made by the appropriating committee, and the only power taken would be merely the matter of appropriations? Nothing could be appropriated unless authorized for the War Department, the Indian Department, the Navy Department, or any other department.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. If the appropriating committee is to be simply a ratifying committee, approving the authorizations which are made, then I see no advantages in it. It would accomplish nothing but to go through a form. If, on the other hand, it prunes and selects the appropriations, the authorizations are mere suggestions.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Authorization could be made for a specific work, but it would be for the appropriating committee to say how much should be appropriated.

Mr. HASTINGS. Then who would know best which was the proper amount, the committee who studied it and authorized it or the other committee that showed no familiarity at all with the subject?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I would say it is the committee that is made up of specialists who have studied with reference to the work of a particular department, men who have been familiar with that work for years, who have made continuous study of it ever since they have been in Congress and knew every detail.

Mr. NEWTON of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Yes.

Mr. NEWTON of Minnesota. If, however, this large appropriation committee was composed of representatives from the appropriating committees of the House as now constituted, would it not meet the gentleman's objection?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. No; it would not meet my objection, because if the work was carried on as the gentleman seems to expect, it would then put the work relating to a particular department in the hands of 2 or 3 instead of 21, as the committees are now constituted, because this big committee would necessarily be divided into subcommittees. There would be two or three who would fix the appropriations; the same for the Indian Affairs; the same for the Department of Agriculture and all of the other departments; instead of a full committee as now constituted.

Mr. NEWTON of Minnesota. I do not understand that the change in the rules calls for the appointment of a certain designated number from the committees, and it occurred to me that the rule should so provide.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I think that would be necessary in any event, and that it would be necessary to subdivide this big appropriating committee, so that there would be as many subcommittees as there are now appropriating.

Mr. NEWTON of Minnesota. Let me call the gentleman's attention to this fact, that there are some large committees to-day who do not have the power of appropriation. Take the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, for example. Their power has not been curtailed, it seems to me, to any great extent beyond the powers of committees that do have appropriating authority.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. It is hardly necessary that that committee should have appropriating powers, as they deal with comparatively little connected with financial matters, except possibly to make up the deficit from the Government's running of the railroads.

Mr. NEWTON of Minnesota. Let me call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that the war-risk insurance act was reported out by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and that carried a large appropriation, larger than the whole appropriation for the Indian affairs.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I think the House has generally agreed that the war-risk insurance never ought to have been given to that committee. The Committee on Interstate Commerce is a great committee, with a distinguished chairman, but it has too much to do, it is overworked, and at times unavoidably delays the business of the House.



Mr. NEWTON of Minnesota. Be that as it may, the power of the Interstate Commerce Committee has not been curtailed because it did not have appropriating power.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. It is curtailed, but in that particular case it would not make any difference, because any sum authorized to be expended by the War Risk must be expended and must be appropriated, but if this big committee is only to make absolutely necessary appropriations, it would not matter so much.

This appropriating committee, if limited as I propose, would not interfere with the several appropriating committees taking up in detail all of these measures and fixing the limit of expense. It would revise the budget system as it came from the director of the budget. It would determine how much the Government should expend in a single year as a total.

Mr. HASTINGS. I entirely agree, but I want to ask the gentleman, if it will not interfere with him, to discuss what these other 400 Members of Congress would do at the short session of Congress, when all the time during that session of Congress is consumed in making appropriations? What would the other 400 Members be doing?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. They would wait mostly, although they would have some duties.

Mr. HASTINGS. There is no general legislation at that session, as everybody knows.

Mr. TILSON. At the present time there are only about 147 Members on these appropriating committees, to begin with. What do all the other members of the committee do? Are not the ordinary Members around them doing just as much work as anybody else? Now, why is it claimed we reduce these 147 men to complete impotence when we have a much larger number of men who have not been on such committees at all, who are very influential Members of this House and are doing good work all the time?

Mr. BLANTON. Where are they to-day?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I do not yield to the gentleman from Texas. The gentleman from Oklahoma, of course, did not speak in a literal sense of the meaning that these Members would have absolutely nothing to do, and there is a larger number of these appropriating committees than stated by the gentleman from Connecticut. They would have work to do, but not much, under the circumstances. Those on the other committees never do have the same amount of work. Did the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON] desire me to yield?

Mr. CANNON. I just want to ask a question. The gentleman is a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, the most important committee of this House, which requires an immense deal of work and constant study to report legislation to bring revenues into the Treasury. What would my friend say to a proposition that there should be several committees called by slightly different names, instead of the Committee on Ways and Means, one to deal with revenues to come from customs, another from direct taxes, and so on and so on? That would give all something to do.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Well, the gentleman is suggesting a proposition that nobody seems seriously to contemplate. The Ways and Means Committee, it is true, has a great amount of work on its hands, but it is unavoidable and its work can not be divided, because this committee in passing on one revenue bill must know how much all our other revenue acts would produce. If left to different committees, the total would be too much or too little. Besides, the methods of raising our revenues are so interwoven that each has a bearing on the other and they can not be separated. I could easily cite many examples. I would say also that the Ways and Means, while its work never ends, is concerned directly with the work of only one department—the Treasury. This proposed committee would deal with all departments and should be familiar with every detail in relation to them. Yet these appropriating committees as now constituted are, for the most part, considered so important and as requiring so much time from a Member who belongs to one of them that he is not permitted to be a member of any other committee.

Mr. Chairman, I trust that what I have said will not be taken as a criticism of the work of the Budget Committee. I have intended rather to assist them in their labors. The committee and its chairman are entitled to great credit for the work which they have done, and I hope that what I have said will not be taken as detracting in the least from the credit to which they are entitled. I have not entered this discussion for the purpose of criticism but rather in the hope that I might assist the committee and the House in the formation of this most important measure. If the modification which I have proposed is adopted it will, in my opinion, not only accomplish all that would be accomplished by the resolution as now drawn but would be likely to result in greater saving than the plan as now presented. The

Appropriations Committee as now constituted is overworked. Its distinguished chairman, who introduced this bill, and many of the members of that committee are compelled to work night and day during the greater portion of the session. Yet their duties are only a small part of what would be cast upon this one big appropriating committee which is proposed, and it would be simply an impossibility for such a committee to give proper consideration to all of the thousands of items of our appropriation bills which now are divided among so many committees. The result would often be that not knowing and not having time to ascertain whether an appropriation, for example, for military or naval purposes could properly be reduced, it would be compelled to adopt the estimate furnished by the department, whereas the Military or Naval Committee, as the case might be, being familiar with every detail pertaining to the appropriation, is not obliged to accept the reasoning or conclusions which are presented by the departmental officials. I hope not only the Budget Committee but the whole House will give careful consideration to this modification proposed.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the section.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. STEAGALL: Page 8, beginning in line 10, strike out all of section 10.

Mr. STEAGALL. Mr. Chairman, I do not care to take up the time of the committee unnecessarily. I had intended to offer this amendment to the preceding section but was out of the Hall for a moment when that section was voted on. If my amendment is adopted, which I hardly anticipate, it is my purpose then to move to strike out the remaining sections and the section just adopted, leaving only the last section of the bill, which should be renumbered. I do this because I for one am opposed to the life-tenure proposition involved in the creation of this office of comptroller general, and I am also opposed to authorizing the head of any department to employ as many people as he sees fit and fix their salaries without let or hindrance from the Congress, the President, or anybody else.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose does the gentleman rise?

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. I rise to speak in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, from the nature of the amendments offered to this budget bill and the tone of the criticism of it, it seems to me that a few remarks under the heading of "Lest we forget" would be in order at this time. It seems to me that some of our good Democratic friends and Republican friends also ought to hark back to the last time we asked the people of the United States to elect a President of the United States. Let me refresh the memory of my Democratic friends by reading a plank in the last Democratic national platform for 1916, as follows:

#### ECONOMY AND THE BUDGET.

We demand careful economy in all expenditures for the support of the Government, and to that end favor a return by the House of Representatives to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee chosen by its membership, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditures standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication in the public service as much as possible avoided. We favor this as a practical step toward a budget system.

Let me also read a paragraph from President Wilson's address to Congress at the opening of our session on the first Monday in December, 1917—

Mr. STEAGALL. Will the gentleman permit a statement?

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. In just a moment. The President appealed to Congress in this language:

And I beg that the Members of the House of Representatives will permit me to express the opinion that it will be impossible to deal in any but a very wasteful and extravagant fashion with the enormous appropriations of the public money which must continue to be made if the war is to be properly sustained unless the House will consent to return to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditures standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication as far as possible avoided.

Mr. STEAGALL. Will the gentleman permit an interruption now?

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. In just a moment. I want to put in one more quotation on this subject. Now, while the Republican national platform of that year—1916—contained a good deal of what might be called—well, I will not call it bunk—

Mr. WILLIAMS. Good reading matter.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. Let me call my Republican friends' attention to a plank in their last national platform, because if it were not meant in good faith this is a good time for the country to know it. The language is as follows:

## ECONOMY AND A NATIONAL BUDGET.

The increasing cost of the National Government and the need for the greatest economy of its resources in order to meet the growing demands of its people Government service call for the severest condemnation of the wasteful appropriations of this Democratic administration and of its shameless raid on the Treasury and of its opposition and rejection of President Taft's oft-repeated proposals and earnest efforts to secure economy and efficiency through the establishment of a simple, businesslike budget system—

[Applause on the Republican side.]

to which we pledge our support and which we hold to be necessary to effect any real reform in the administration of national finances.

Mr. MADDEN. Well, we are putting the recommendations of the Republican national platform into execution now.

Mr. STEAGALL. Will the gentleman permit an interruption now?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. I ask for two minutes' extension.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. STEAGALL. The gentleman is becoming interesting as a historian. I should not be surprised some time if he should possibly make reference to the Constitution of the United States or the Bible and possibly the Ten Commandments.

Do we understand the gentleman to say that the Republican platform was all bunk?

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. No; I did not say it was all bunk. But I do say if they do not carry out this provision in good faith that part of it at least would be.

Mr. STEAGALL. I understood the gentleman to say so, and I want him to produce the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GOOD] to prove that the Democratic platform is all bunk, and then I wish to suggest that neither platform nor any platform of any party that ever held a convention ever declared for life tenure in office, or for any department of this Government having the right to appoint as many employees as it pleased.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. I desire to say that the Select Committee on the Budget has heard some of the most able and distinguished people of the United States on this subject. There is not a line in this bill that has not had exhaustive consideration. And we have gone into this matter as intelligently, conscientiously, and thoroughly as any committee could. We have examined the systems of other countries and of our various State and city systems and the works of the most distinguished writers on the subject, and have come to the unanimous conclusion that these provisions, as embraced in this bill, are not only proper but necessary in order to carry out in good faith our party platform promises to the American people, and in order that we may honestly enact the pledges upon which we were elected to this Congress two years ago last fall and again last fall. Now, when our country is confronted with the frightful and appalling debt of over \$26,000,000,000; when there is the most imperative need for economy in every direction; when every farseeing and patriotic citizen in this country is warning the country and Congress against waste and extravagance, and appealing for a retrenchment of expenditures in every possible way, I know that this Congress is not going to repudiate our promises to our country or to our constituents. In this dire financial situation of our Nation, I know this House will keep the faith and pass this bill substantially in the form in which the committee has brought it before the House.

Any Member of either this House or of the Senate who votes or works against this measure not only violates his party's platform but I prophesy that he will have a mighty hard time ever explaining his actions and that he will have occasion to regret it as long as he lives, and I am going to try to see that every Member of this House goes on record by a roll—Vote on this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. STEAGALL].

The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. OSBORNE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. OSBORNE: Page 9, line 4, strike out the word "them" and insert the word "it"; page 9, line 5, strike out the word "are" and insert the word "is"; page 9, line 8, strike out the word "debtors" and insert the word "debtor"; page 9, line 6, strike out the word "creditors" and insert the word "creditor."

Mr. OSBORNE. Mr. Chairman, this section reads as follows:

SEC. 236. All claims and demands whatever by the United States or against them, and all accounts whatever in which the United States are concerned, either as debtors or creditors, shall be settled and adjusted in the accounting department.

My amendment goes not only to the grammatical construction but to the fact, "United States" is singular and not plural.

This matter was settled long ago, not only by the rules of grammar but by the rules of war. We fought four years to establish the fact that the United States is one country and not a collection of municipalities.

I submit my amendment for the consideration of the committee.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I will say to the gentleman from California and to the committee that our committee had nothing to do with the formulation of the language in this paragraph. The section is in all respects the present law except as we struck out the word "Treasury" in line 6 and put in the word "accounting." We have not attempted to change the language in a single particular, and when the gentleman says that we should use the word "is" instead of the word "are," and that "United States" is singular instead of plural. I call his attention to section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States, where it would seem that the framers of the Constitution had about the same notion as the framers of the law which we have followed. Section 2 provides:

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.

Now, we use the word "them" here just as the framers of the Constitution used the word "their."

Mr. OSBORNE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GOOD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. OSBORNE. Is it not a fact that the Constitution in that regard was amended between 1861 and 1865?

Mr. GOOD. That provision has never been amended.

Mr. OSBORNE. It has been amended in fact.

Mr. GOOD. That provision stands as the framers of the Constitution made it.

Mr. CANNON. Will the gentleman yield? Are we not better to-day than they were?

Mr. GOOD. Well, they were pretty good. The framers of the Constitution were men of ripe scholarship; many of them had graduated in the best colleges of America, and a great many of them—31 I believe it was—had graduated from the large universities of the Old World, and they were trained in the school of statesmanship. And I have never yet, as far as I am personally concerned, been willing to quarrel with their grammar, and I am not now.

Mr. CANNON. Then the gentleman does not think that hypercriticism has any place?

Mr. OSBORNE. Will the gentleman from Iowa yield further?

Mr. GOOD. I will.

Mr. OSBORNE. Does not the gentleman think that in a matter of this kind, if there was an error in the first place, it should be changed in enacting a new section, and that the United States is, in fact, a Nation, and should not be designated as "them" or be mentioned in the plural form? I think so.

Mr. GOOD. I will say to the gentleman from California that the Congress that enacted this legislation followed the language in the Constitution. They referred here to the United States as "them," and, of course, if we use that, we must also use the plural all the way through.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman desire to be heard on this amendment?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. I do. I wish to ask the gentleman a question as to what claims and demands this section relates to. It says:

All claims and demands whatever . . . shall be settled and adjusted in the accounting department.

Mr. GOOD. Of course, that has been construed a great many times by the comptroller. Those are claims and demands for the payment for which an appropriation has been made. Of course, it would have no relation to a claim or demand that necessarily had to go to the Court of Claims. It is only those that are authorized by law and for which an appropriation has been made and which can be settled under the decision of the comptroller to determine.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Of course, the Congress itself passes upon claims and demands against the Government and often authorizes their payment. It would seem that this language as it stands would authorize the accounting department to determine the question of the legal or equitable liability of the Government in some cases.

Mr. GOOD. That judicial construction has never been given by the comptroller, and this language has been on the statute books for a long time; a similar provision was carried in the law as far back as 1817. Practically that language has been on

the statute books, and all we are changing now is to strike out the word "Treasury" and insert the word "accounting" instead.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. The construction may have been given, but certainly the language would justify another construction. Some other comptroller or some other official might change the construction.

Mr. GOOD. We accepted that for 100 years and more. It has been on the statute books that long, and it has received judicial construction and a department construction, and all we are here attempting to do is to confer that power which the Treasury Department now has to settle claims of this character on the accounting department.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Well, I think in this bill some changes for the better have been made, and in the very framing of this bill the committee has properly disregarded precedents and departed from old customs. It seems to me the committee should have gone a little further and corrected the ambiguity and the patent mistakes in the law. I say that in connection with the amendment suggested by the gentleman from California [Mr. Osborne]. I think he is entirely right in suggesting the change of those words to make them singular instead of plural, and I would suggest some change in this section, so that no other construction but the one that has been given will be possible.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, the accounting officers have authority under the law to state two classes of accounts; one for which a lapsed appropriation has previously existed; the other a liability which had arisen under specific statute authorizing, for instance, the appointment of an officer, but no appropriation having been made therefor.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. But this section says "all claims and demands whatever."

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. That is within the range of the accounting system. That would be the construction there.

Mr. SANDERS of Indiana and Mr. DOWELL rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Indiana desire recognition?

Mr. SANDERS of Indiana. Yes. I move to strike out the last word of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana moves to strike out the last word.

Mr. SANDERS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I think this budget bill is wise legislation. I think it follows along the lines of economy. In discussing the question of economy yesterday a statement was made on the floor criticizing in a mild way, but nevertheless criticizing, the demands of the bituminous coal miners for an increase in wages. I hold no brief for the United Mine Workers of America, Mr. Chairman, but I want to make a very brief statement about the underlying causes of the present dispute between the bituminous miners and operators.

In April, 1916, through their representatives the organized miners and the operators entered into a two-year contract. The wages paid labor in other industries soon went beyond the wages agreed upon in 1916, and the operators began to pay bonuses in order to attract labor to their mines and to keep up the output. The situation growing out of the payment of bonuses became so acute and unsatisfactory that the operators themselves were glad to make some arrangement by which the 1916 contract could be supplemented by a provision permitting the payment of a sufficient wage to attract labor. Hence in March, 1917, a supplementary agreement was entered into by which all contract miners were paid 10 cents per ton additional. Under this supplemental contract the machine men were advanced from 52 cents to 62 cents per ton, the men engaged in pick work were advanced from 64 cents to 74 cents per ton, and the day men were advanced from \$2.98 to \$3.60 per day. This contract continued in effect until November 1, 1917.

In October, 1917, the coal market was under the control of the Fuel Administration. The operators desired an increase in the price of their coal. The general wage level had rapidly risen, and Dr. H. A. Garfield, then Fuel Administrator, brought about an agreement by which the miners, effective November 1, 1917, had their wages advanced and the operators were permitted to advance the price of coal. This so-called Washington agreement made this advance: Contract miners were given 10 cents per ton additional. Thus machine men were increased from 62 cents to 72 cents per ton, pick men were increased from 74 cents to 84 cents per ton, and day men were increased

so that their day wages amounted to \$5 per day. Since then no further advance in wages has been made.

It will thus be seen that the total increase since April 1, 1916, more than a year before our entrance into the war, was only 20 cents per ton, or 29 per cent for pick men and 38.4 per cent for machine miners and that the day men have not been advanced beyond \$5 per day, although in percentage that amounts to 68 per cent increase; the day men only include about 27 per cent of the total employees.

It is interesting in connection with these figures to know that while the advanced increase of labor was less than 44 per cent that the advanced retail sale price of coal was more than 110 per cent.

This Washington agreement contains this clause:

This agreement is subject to and will become effective only on the condition that the selling price of coal shall be advanced by the United States Government sufficient to cover the increased cost in the different districts affected and will take effect on the first day of the pay period following the order advancing such increased prices.

The whole tenor of this Washington contract is that the coal miners should receive their proportion of the increased revenue obtained by the coal operator for the sale of his coal.

Many months ago Dr. Garfield deemed the war sufficiently over that he abandoned all restrictions upon the selling price of coal and disbanded the Fuel Administration and retired to private life. The coal operators are no longer bound by any war restrictions, and I am reliably informed that free coal is frequently sold at \$2.75 per ton at the mouth of the mine and sometimes brings \$4 per ton. This is in sharp contrast to the \$2.35 per ton fixed at the time the Washington agreement was entered into.

The fourth clause of the Washington agreement provides that the mine workers' representatives agreed that the present contract be extended during the continuation of the war and not to exceed two years from April 1, 1918.

Actual hostilities ceased on November 11, 1918, and practically all of the bureaus organized during the war have long ago been disbanded, including the Fuel Administration. It certainly can not be contended that this agreement was meant to last until the war should technically be terminated by the exchange of peace treaties. If such be the case, it could be contended that it not only means that peace be concluded with Germany, but that it should continue until we made peace with Austria.

The United Mine Workers of America have steadfastly and faithfully observed the provisions of this contract and have waited until almost a year after the close of hostilities before asking an increase and long after the operators have ceased being hampered by governmental control.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SANDERS of Indiana. I am sorry I can not. In a Terre Haute, Ind., newspaper of last week I find an advertisement by a coal operator for men to do pick work. In the same paper is an advertisement for plasterers at \$1 per hour, and an advertisement for men to work at a creosoting plant for \$5 to \$8 per day.

It must be remembered that coal miners frequently only get to work two or three days per week, and in computing their wages this must be taken into consideration. If this is done, it is clear to the unbiased mind that the day laborer in the coal mine is not paid a wage commensurate with the carpenter, the plasterer, bricklayer, railroad engineer, shipworker, and many laborers in other industries.

He is engaged in a dangerous occupation. For over a quarter of a century the United Mine Workers of America have, by means of collective bargaining with the coal operators, made amicable agreements for the production of coal, fair and beneficial alike to the operators, miners, and the public.

The machinery for adjusting disputes, including the present one, is still intact. In the past they have bargained and compromised and used a good supply of common sense on both sides. I am not undertaking to say that all the demands of the miners should be granted, but I have recited the above facts in order to show that it is quite within the range of practicability for an adjustment to be made of the present controversy. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana has expired.

Mr. SANDERS of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana asks unanimous consent to revise and extend his remarks. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the section.

Mr. GOOD. There is an amendment pending. Let us perfect the amendment.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania desire to be heard on the amendment?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, while there may be some difference of opinion as to the grammatical construction of this sentence, there ought to be no difference of opinion as to what the committee has done in placing this section in the law they are asking us to enact. The committee simply quote from the old law a paragraph for the purpose of changing a word and making that law harmonize with the budget bill which we are considering. In quoting it they ought to have quoted it as it was on the statute books. They are simply seeking to amend it to make it harmonize with the present legislation, and the question of the grammatical construction of the paragraph is not, and ought not to be, before the House.

Besides, this paragraph is taken out of its context for the purpose of making this amendment. Hence in only reading it we do not get the best idea of what it means. But when we read that paragraph in its place, which is in the legislation designed to create the Treasury Department and to regulate accounting, it is easily understood then what is meant by "all claims against the Government," made by the Government or against the Government, shall be settled in this department. It is simply a part of the mechanism by which accounts in the Treasury Department shall be settled, so that in the consideration of this measure we ought not to concern ourselves with the grammatical construction of the sentence but let us perfect it in order to make it harmonize with the scope and purpose of this bill.

Mr. DOWELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOWELL. What is the necessity for inserting an accounting department instead of the Treasury Department?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Why, the very purpose of this bill is to create an accounting department that shall be independent of all the executive departments of the Government. If these accounts are to be settled in the Treasury Department, it would maintain the old régime, whereas striking out the word "Treasury" and inserting the word "Accounting" would bring this law into harmony with the budget scheme.

Mr. DOWELL. But in this amendment do you not add to the accounting department another duty, aside from accounting? As I understand it, under the budget system you are establishing an accounting department that has for its purpose the accounting of all accounts of all the departments of the Government. In this you put the duty upon the accounting department of settling claims both for and against the United States, entirely a different duty. Who has the accounting of that department after it has been passed upon by the accounting department? Could it not be done by the Treasury Department as well as by the auditing department, to check it up?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. No. If the gentleman will refer to section 10 of this proposed measure, he will find the provision there, as follows:

All powers and duties now conferred or imposed by law upon the Comptroller of the Treasury or upon the Auditor for the Treasury Department—

Shall be exercised, and so forth.

Mr. DOWELL. I understand that.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Now, you want to make this old law harmonious with that. Hence, you strike out the word "Treasury" and relieve them from this accounting and auditing, and put it where it belongs, in this general auditing department created under this budget bill.

Mr. GOOD. And the Comptroller of the Treasury is the man who has been functioning with regard to this provision of the statute all along.

Mr. DOWELL. That is true; but it is all done in the name of the Treasurer, and can it not be done in the same manner with this accounting department? And is there any difference now from the old system of the Treasurer making these settlements both for and against the Government, when they have the accounting department here to determine the exact amount of it?—And is there any difference now in the plan, under this new controlling system and under the old?

Mr. GOOD. I ask for a vote on the amendment.

Mr. BLANTON. I move to strike out the last three words of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas). That would be an amendment in the third degree. The gentleman can get in on the next section. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. OSBORNE].

Mr. OSBORNE. I ask that the amendment be again reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will again report the amendment.

The amendment was read, as follows:

Amendment by Mr. OSBORNE: Page 9, line 4, strike out the word "them" and insert the word "it"; page 9, line 5, strike out the word "are" and insert the word "is"; page 9, line 5, strike out the word "debtors" and insert the word "debtor"; page 9, line 6, strike out the word "creditors" and insert the word "creditor."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

Sec. 11. That the offices of the six auditors enumerated in section 10 shall be abolished, to take effect July 1, 1920, but the then incumbents of those offices shall be transferred, at their present salaries, to become officers of the accounting department. All other officers and employees of these offices shall become officers and employees in the accounting department at their grades and salaries on July 1, 1920. All books, records, documents, papers, furniture, office equipment, and other property of these offices shall become the property of the accounting department. The accounting department shall occupy the rooms now occupied by the office of the Comptroller of the Treasury and the six auditors referred to in section 10 until otherwise provided.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the section. I do this, however, to discuss another subject.

If I understood the remarks of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. SANDERS], he was speaking in favor of the contention of the miners who are now threatening a Nation-wide strike on November 1. If I understood the first contention that was made by these men in their demands upon their employers, it was to decrease the hours of the workday, so that the work day should consist of only six hours. If that should be granted it would of itself decrease the production 25 per cent.

I understand further that the next contention was that the work week should be five days instead of six; in other words, that in working a week and receiving pay for a week, the men should work only five days, and should have two days off out of the week. If that had been granted by their employers, it of itself would have decreased the output and the production another 16 2/3 per cent, making a total decrease in production of 41 2/3 per cent. These contentions are expected to take effect, and if not granted the strike is to ensue, on the 1st day of November, when the cold weather has set in from one side of this country to the other.

Mr. DOWELL. I raise the point of order that the gentleman is not talking upon the amendment.

Mr. BLANTON. Oh, if the gentleman does not want to permit me to answer the remarks of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. SANDERS], he has a right to hold me down to the pro forma amendment, but I hope he will permit me to speak on this subject for a few minutes.

Mr. DOWELL. I insist on the point of order.

Mr. BLANTON. The gentleman surely is not in favor of having women and little children freeze to death in this country during December, January, and February.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is clearly out of order.

Mr. BLANTON. I hope the gentleman will withdraw his point of order.

Mr. DOWELL. I insist on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. BLANTON. I will try to hold myself within the scope of the pro forma amendment. This particular section, Mr. Chairman, is embraced within a new piece of legislation before the House proposed to reduce the expenses of the Government. If the committee are warranted in their assertion, it will save expense to this Government. I want to say that the first thing we must consider in saving expense to this Government is instead of decreasing production to increase production. That has been the trouble with this country, and that has been the trouble with Congress all along, that we have sat here in our seats supinely, month after month, and have permitted the production of the country to be decreased all the time, instead of taking steps, instead of lending our voices to a proposition that would bring about the maximum production in this country. You can not bring about maximum production by decreasing the hours of the workday from eight to six, and you can not bring about maximum production in this country by decreasing the work week from six days to five days.

Mr. DOWELL. Mr. Chairman, I renew my point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.



Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Nebraska offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska: Page 9, line 11, after the word "at," strike the words "their present," and after the word "salaries," in . . . insert "of \$4,000 each," so that as amended it will read:

"Sec. 11. That the offices of the six auditors enumerated in section 10 shall be abolished, to take effect July 1, 1920, but the then incumbents of those offices shall be transferred, at salaries of \$4,000 each, to become officers of the accounting department."

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, four of the auditors at present receive \$4,000 per annum. Two of them receive \$5,000 per annum. Under the act of 1894 their salaries were uniform, and under the law prior to that time uniform salaries prevailed. Political exigency brought about an increase of the salary of the Auditor for the War Department \$1,000 a year some years ago, so that since that time that auditor has been receiving \$5,000. A like political exigency and personal favoritism brought about an increase of the salary of the Auditor for the Post Office Department from \$4,000 to \$5,000.

My amendment proposes to restore the uniform rule that had prevailed during the greater portion of the history of the country, and to make these salaries all alike at \$4,000 per annum.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. ANDREWS].

The amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

Sec. 12. That the comptroller general shall appoint, remove, and fix the compensation of such officers and employees in the department as may from time to time be provided for by Congress, and perform all other duties of a head of an independent Government establishment. All such appointments, except to positions carrying a salary of \$5,000 a year, shall be made from lists of eligibles furnished by the Civil Service Commission and in accordance with the civil-service laws and regulations. No person appointed by the comptroller general shall be paid a salary in excess of \$5,000 a year, and not more than three persons appointed by him shall be paid a salary at that rate. Until March 5, 1921, no person who at the time of the passage of this act holds office as one of the six auditors referred to in section 10, and who in pursuance of section 11 is transferred to the accounting department, shall be removed from office or have his compensation reduced, except for cause. All officers and employees of the department, whether transferred to the department in pursuance of section 11 or appointed by the comptroller general, shall perform such duties as may be assigned to them by the comptroller general. The comptroller general shall make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying on the work of the department.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 9, line 21, after the word "appoint," insert the word "and"; after the word "remove," in line 22, strike out the words "and fix the compensation of."

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, the object of this amendment is to prevent the comptroller general from fixing the salaries of the officers and employees in his department. I do not know why we Members of Congress should shift this function to the comptroller general. We do know that this power has been abused for years, and especially during the last two years. We find in one department of the Government where ordinary men of \$1,200 a year capacity have been paid salaries by the Secretary of Labor ranging up to \$10,000 a year.

Let me bring one illustration from another department to your attention. There is no man in this House who thinks more than I do of the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Sherley. There is no man in this House who has rendered more valuable work for his country as chairman of the great Committee on Appropriations than that gentleman from Kentucky. He did it on a salary of \$7,500 a year. He sought in the last election to be permitted to continue that valuable service for his country on a salary of only \$7,500 a year. If he had been reelected he would be in this House to-day rendering the same kind of valuable services to his country for only \$7,500 a year.

And yet as soon as he went out of office he was placed immediately by Director General Hines in the railroad office down here and paid a salary of \$25,000 a year. I want to say that we can not depend on our heads of departments to use good judgment in fixing salaries of officers and employees in their departments. If the distinguished and able gentleman from Kentucky, whom we all love, admire, and respect, was willing of his own accord, voluntarily, to offer his services to the Government for the coming two years at \$7,500 a year—the very best service there was in him—why should he be paid for rendering no better service—because no man could render better service than Swager Sherley rendered in the House last year—if he was willing to render the best service of which a man is capable for the coming two years at \$7,500, why should he be

paid out of the people's Treasury \$25,000? Why should he be paid twice the salary of a Cabinet officer? No reason except that we failed to do our duty in retaining our proper function to fix salaries.

I want to say to my good friends on the other side of the aisle that if you mean what you say, that you want to retrench expenses, if you were sincere in your promise to the people that you would retrench and see that the expenses of the Government were decreased, why will you put into a measure you have brought in a provision leaving it in the comptroller general's power to fix salaries of his own employees and officers in his department?

I know there is a provision in the bill to the extent of fixing a maximum limit on it, but there is still power to fix the compensation, a function which this Congress should exercise, and only the Congress.

I want to say that the time should be here when we should quit passing the buck; we ought to assume the responsibilities of our own positions; and as one Member of Congress I am not yet ready to turn the power and responsibility that is in this Congress over to the head of some department. I hope this provision will be stricken out, though I am hoping in vain, as I realize that on same I will vote in a hopeless minority of probably one.

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, in reply to the argument of the gentleman from Texas in support of his amendment, I wish to state in opposition to it that the law already makes it impossible for the comptroller general to exercise any considerable range of discretion in fixing the salaries of clerks and employees in these offices. Nearly all the clerks and employees in these offices now have fixed statutory salaries. There is, perhaps, a very small number under the charge of the Auditor for the Post Office Department, in relation to a minor character of work, that do not have a fixed statutory salary. That is small, however, and hardly worthy of consideration.

After the transfer is made, as proposed in this bill, the statutory salaries will remain and the appropriations stand for those salaries. The comptroller will have the same authority and power then that the head of a department has now to promote from the lower grades in the office to higher statutory salaries, and he will have no power unless Congress abolishes the law fixing statutory salaries and give a lump sum, which I am very sure it will not do. The idea that there is danger here of a wrong exercise of power is misplaced because of the fact that the statutory salaries exist.

Mr. VAILE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. I will yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. VAILE. If salaries are fixed by statute, why is it necessary here to provide in this act, line 22, that the comptroller general shall appoint, remove, and fix a compensation of such officers and employees, and so forth?

Mr. ANDREWS of Nebraska. He may appoint to the statutory salaries; he may promote a clerk from \$1,200 to \$1,400 or \$1,500, and he can fix the salary within those limits when he does so. But unless Congress should give him a lump-sum appropriation, out of which he could fix salaries at his own discretion, he will not be able to exercise the power. He does not now have the appropriation to do anything of the kind.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. BLANTON) there were 1 aye and 59 noes.

So the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

Sec. 13. That the comptroller general shall investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds, and shall make to Congress, at the beginning of each regular session, a report in writing of the work of the accounting department, containing recommendations concerning the legislation he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition and settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds as he may think advisable. He shall make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee of either House having jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations, or expenditures. The comptroller general shall also, at the request of any such committee, direct assistants from his office to furnish the committee such aid and information as the committee may request.

All departments, bureaus, boards, commissions, offices, agencies, or other establishments of the Government, except the legislative branch and the Supreme Court, shall furnish to the comptroller general such information regarding the powers, duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and methods of business of their respective offices as he may from time to time require of them; and the comptroller general, or any of his assistants or employees when duly authorized by him, shall, for the purpose of securing such information, have access, to and the right to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of any such department, bureau, board, commission, office, agency, or other establishment. The authority contained in this paragraph shall not be applicable to expenditures made under the provisions of section 291 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania: Page 11, line 11, after the period in line 11, add "the comptroller general shall specially report to the House every expenditure or contract made by any head of a department in any year in excess of the appropriation to such department and in violation of law."

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is intended to effectuate the very purpose and object of a budget system. A budget system is intended to have the Government of the United States live carefully and economically within its estimated revenues. We have a law requiring that no department head shall exceed the appropriation made to the department in any of the expenditures of the department or in the making of contracts that would go beyond the appropriations. It is made an offense to do so. No one seems to pay much attention to it, however. Of course, during the war period we all passed it by without question, because the terrible exigency that confronted us required such treatment, and in every case of extreme condition like that the same treatment would in all probability be accorded. It does seem to me, however, there ought to be a requirement on the part of the comptroller general to lay before Congress every infraction of this existing law, so that Congress may take notice of it and act upon it or pass it by, as it deems proper.

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Surely.

Mr. GARD. I am in thorough accord with the purpose of the gentleman's amendment. I call his attention to his amendment. It provides that the comptroller general shall make this report to the House. Does not the gentleman mean that he shall report to the Congress?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Yes; the criticism is well taken. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to insert, instead of the word "House," the word "Congress."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the modification will be made.

There was no objection.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I am in sympathy with the purpose of the gentleman's amendment, but am wondering whether or not it would interfere with a practice the Congress has permitted some heads of departments, to divert money from one appropriation to another. In the framing of the bill for the Department of Agriculture it is usual to permit the Secretary under some conditions to divert 10 per cent of one fund to another use in his line of work. If the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAHAM] should be adopted, would not such provisions be impossible? If it were made unlawful for the Secretary to exceed under any circumstances the amount of money appropriated for a particular use, would it not make impossible the giving of authority to divert a portion of one appropriation to another use?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Is not a transfer required to be authorized before it can be made from one department to another?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. This is not a transfer from one department to another, but from one purpose to another in the same department, and appropriation bills themselves permit such transfer. My inquiry is, Would this amendment if adopted make such legislation as we have many times enacted be permitted?

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Would not the same reason and objection apply to that, and, therefore, that would not be an expenditure in excess of the appropriation and in violation of law.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. It would be in excess of the appropriation. The gentleman is aware that many of the appropriation bills are prepared by paragraphs, each one setting out a particular line of work to be carried on by the department, and the amount of money available for that particular purpose is stated in the paragraph. There are many of those, and the total amount carried by the bill is the footing of the amounts of the different paragraphs. Some of the appropriation bills carry authority to the Secretary under certain circumstances to take from one appropriation 10 per cent of its amount and use it for some other purpose. That is permitted by law. His use of money in that way would not be contrary to law, but it would be a use of money in excess of the appropriation made for the particular purpose. Under a narrow interpretation of the amendment offered by the gentleman, might not the Secretary find himself unable to take advantage of that ordinary provision?

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. GOOD. I do not believe that construction would be placed upon it. After all, it is all done by authority of law. By authority of law the Secretary is permitted to transfer from one appropriation an amount not more than 10 per cent for some other service in his department.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. It is in excess of the amount of money appropriated for that purpose forbidden by the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. GOOD. It is not when you take the whole law together—that he could not only use the exact sum but 10 per cent of another sum for that purpose.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. Was not that done only for duration of the war and in one department?

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. No; the Agricultural bills have carried that provision for a longer period than the gentleman thinks.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania. It is only in the Agricultural Department that it does apply.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. I know of it in that department.

Mr. GOOD. It also obtains in the Reclamation Service.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, may we have the amendment again reported as modified?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will again report the amendment as modified.

There was no objection, and the Clerk read as follows:

Page 11, line 11, after the period, in line 11, add:

"The comptroller general shall specially report to the Congress every expenditure or contract made by any head of a department in any year in excess of the appropriation to such department and in violation of law."

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I can not believe that the construction referred to by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. McLAUGHLIN] would be applied to this amendment. I think there is good in the amendment and I am inclined to accept it.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I do not see any objection to the amendment offered; and I think it ought to be agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LUCE: Page 10, line 22, strike out the first "and" and insert after the word "disbursement," the words "and application"; page 11, line 3, strike out the word "and"; and in line 4, after the word "disbursement," insert the words "and application."

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, this is the first of a group of amendments I submit for the attention of the committee in the hope that if the measure as now written does not accomplish its purpose fully these amendments will contribute something thereto. I want to add my name to those recorded as expressing gratitude to the committee for the great service it has rendered to the Congress and to the Nation. The report of the hearings, to which I have devoted much time, strikes me as the most valuable contribution to political science that has of late come from any press, and I want to put into the Record this statement in order that students of political science may have their attention directed to it and may profit by the great mass of information and suggestion which it contains. Also, I want to express my personal gratitude to the gentlemen of the committee for bringing out so clearly in their questions and statements in those hearings the defense of Congress against the multifarious assaults of uninformed critics. It would be well worth the while of the House to have this defense segregated from the rest of the volume and by some skillful writer put into readable form. This judgment, I think, may assure the gentlemen of the committee of my complete sympathy with what they have attempted to accomplish. But after earnest study, after reading their bill again and again, I fail to find that they anywhere have expressed in it what they gave us to understand was its purpose. They told us that in here creating two new agencies, one a Bureau of the Budget and the other a comptroller general, they desired to secure study and criticism of the operations of government which would accrue to the common advantage. Let me cite for example the words of their chairman in his own report:

The comptroller could and would be expected to criticize extravagance, duplication, and inefficiency in executive departments.

We want the comptroller to do that. We are passing this law in order that he shall do that, but there is not one word in the bill which tells him to do that. There is not one word in the bill



which tells the budget bureau to do that. It may be that I am treading on dangerous ground, that there is some practical reason why this bill was written without anywhere giving a concrete and specific definition of the duties of these officers. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread, and possibly I am approaching something that the committee has considered and perhaps not thought wise to put into the bill. If its members will show me anywhere in it a clear statement of what these officers are to do in the way of criticism I will gladly withdraw my suggestions of amendment, suggestions offered not in hostility but for the purpose of illuminating what seem to me should be the very heart and center of this measure. Sir, the other day I referred on the floor of this House to my Sabine farm, and if my friend the chairman of the committee would go down there with me I would take him through the portals of my barn and would show him hanging on the wall a hoe and rake, a stub scythe—the same one I stuck in the hornet's nest—a pruning knife and pruning shears, and all the other instruments for getting rid of wasteful growth. Then if he were a candidate for work on my farm, what would you think if I turned my back on him and went out of the door without saying another word? An employer under those circumstances, after showing those instruments of work, would say, "Now go to it."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LUCE. I ask unanimous consent for five minutes additional.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. LUCE. My desire is that we shall get into this bill a declaration to those men "to go to it," to exercise criticism. In his speech on this bill, a most admirable speech, which I hope will get into general circulation, the chairman stated:

*Men will be employed as auditors who will owe their positions to their training and ability and who do not secure their positions as reward for political services. They will be fearless in their examinations—*

And so forth.

Yet nowhere does the bill itself say they are to be fearless in their examinations, or, indeed, that they are to make any examinations at all for critical purposes. In the course of the hearings a member of the committee [Mr. GARNER] said:

*I agree with you that that is what ought to be had. There should be in the executive branch of the Government some adverse agency to scrutinize every estimate that is made, with discretion to recommend to the President that the estimates be cut down.*

There is not in the bill a single intimation that the bureau of the budget is to make any such recommendation. Everything to the effect that these things are to be done is a matter of inference and implication.

Mr. JUUL. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUCE. I do.

Mr. JUUL. I would ask the gentleman if he does not think section 13 covers the subject matter, where, in line 20, it states:

*That the comptroller general shall investigate at the seat of Government or elsewhere all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds, and shall make the Congress, at the beginning of each regular session—*

And so forth.

Mr. LUCE. I think that is entirely by indirection. There is nowhere any statement that he is to apply the results of his investigations. Let me point out further. This section begins by providing that the comptroller general is to investigate all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds. From time immemorial the word "disbursement" has in the popular significance implied a restriction to the paying out of money, a purely ministerial function with no exercise of judgment. I am reminded of the anecdote of the schoolboy who was writing an examination paper on physiology. He was told to state what he knew about brains, and he said, "Brains are the most precious part of the human anatomy, and therefore we ought to be exceedingly sparing in their use." [Laughter.]

The trouble with this section is that it does not require the use of brains in the way of exercising the critical faculty.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUCE. Certainly.

Mr. MADDEN. I think the gentleman must have overlooked the fact that we are taking over the duties of the comptroller and auditor's offices, under which they are operating to-day, and there is a law defining the duties of the comptroller and auditor already in existence, and there is no necessity for repeating it in this bill.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, in the hearings on this subject there was frequent quotation from authorities upon the English

system, and all the inference is that this system before you was borrowed from and modeled upon the English system.

Mr. MADDEN. That is not true, though. We did not model it on anything except the facts in the case.

Mr. LUCE. May I before going further—because I do not wish to take the time of the House uselessly—ask the chairman of the committee if it is his intention that the comptroller general shall criticize?

Mr. GOOD. It certainly is.

Mr. LUCE. That is just what the English comptroller general does. It is insured that he shall criticize. He is not a mere ministerial officer. As Mr. Collins told the committee, he inquires into questions of legality, regularity, extravagance. He is the critic and he represents the House of Commons.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman's time be extended five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Unanimous consent is asked by the gentleman from Texas that the time of the gentleman from Massachusetts be extended five minutes. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, I had read from Mr. Collins's statement that in England the comptroller general is the critic; that is to say, the faultfinder, the man looking for trouble; but in this bill, according to the intimation of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MADDEN], it is not clear that he is to be a critic. The gentleman from Illinois says you are taking over certain functions that are now provided by law. Those functions have never been considered as including criticism. Are we to say that the gentleman from Iowa is right or the gentleman from Illinois is right? Is this official to criticize or not to criticize? And when you put a man in that position and he looks to the law for his guidance, where would he find any instruction that he is to criticize?

I speak advisedly in this matter, because experience in my own State fortifies me. Some years ago we provided a finance commission in the city of Boston. It stands outside of the city government. It is a censorious body, which makes its whole duty to find fault with what is done in administering the public affairs of the city of Boston. It worked so well that we created a similar body for the State of Massachusetts. At first that did not function usefully, and then we replaced it with a supervisor of administration, who now excellently performs the duties of a censor. It is his business to find fault, and he, with a large corps of assistants, spends the whole year in studying the departments in order to find fault and tell where money can be saved.

Now, that is what these gentlemen have assured us they meant to do, so far as we may follow the words of the chairman of the committee, and I accept his judgment in the matter. But I point out to you that this has not been done. For instantly the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MADDEN] makes a statement raising a doubt as to whether we have conferred such duties on this official.

All I am asking is, if you mean to authorize this man to criticize, to study, and investigate for the purpose of securing economy, that the committee shall, if they do not approve my way of directing it, suggest some way of their own, so that no man when he goes into that office can rely upon the statute and say, "This law imposed on me but a purely ministerial function, made me a human adding machine, and my only duty is to total up the figures that are laid before me and to transmit them to the Congress."

Mr. BLANTON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. LUCE. Certainly.

Mr. BLANTON. However valuable the gentleman's suggestions may be, do they not come too late, for after a measure is reported here to the Committee of the Whole House by one of the committees, is it not a good deal like the law of the Medes and Persians—unchangeable?

Mr. LUCE. Should I to-day or ever submit to this House a proposal that does not commend itself to a majority of the House and to at least a part of the committee, I shall feel that I have made a mistake and shall waive my own judgment. If I can not prove to the committee that the addition of a few words of injunction will make it clear beyond any question that they mean to create a censoring office, then I will withdraw these amendments and ask no further attention to them.

The first of these amendments contemplates adding to the present phraseology "receipt and disbursement," the word "application," so that we shall say that the comptroller general shall investigate the receipt and disbursement—that is, the ministerial act of paying out the money—and shall also investigate the application of the funds; in other words, make it clear to him that he is to examine how these funds are used. [Applause.]

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the gentleman's remarks with great interest, because I have a very high opinion of his ability and judgment. If by adding the words we are strengthening the arm of the comptroller general to make a more thorough examination, to search into an expenditure, and see whether or not money is being paid out in violation of law or uselessly expended, then I would have no objection, of course, to the adoption of the amendment. I am not real sure that I have any objection as it is. But let us see whether or not it really strengthens the provision in that respect. The law provides, Revised Statutes, section 3678:

All sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no other.

No executive has the power under that provision of the law to spend a single dollar of appropriation except for the purposes for which the appropriation is made. Now, keeping that provision in mind, let us read the provision found in section 13 of the bill:

That the comptroller general shall investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds, and shall make to Congress—

And so forth.

Now, the gentleman would insert the words "and application," so that it will read, "The comptroller general shall investigate at the seat of government or elsewhere all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds." I want to submit to the gentleman that the investigation of all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of the public funds includes any application that shall be made of them.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GOOD. Yes.

Mr. CANNON. Suppose the disbursements have been made in California, in Texas, and everywhere else. Are we to have an army of people to go down there or out there and see that the work was done? Is that what the gentleman means?

Mr. GOOD. No. The gentleman does not have reference to that particularly. It is the contention of the gentleman by this amendment simply, as I understand it, to give the comptroller more power in the way of criticizing expenditures that have been made. It is his point that the words we have employed, giving the comptroller the power to investigate matters relating to the receipt and disbursement, does not in itself imply the power to criticize and to make an investigation as a foundation for criticism.

Now, in referring to the dictionary I find the definition best fitted to the word "application" used here is "specific use," and I take it that is what the gentleman has in mind in offering the amendment here; that the comptroller general shall not only investigate the receipts and expenditures, but the specific use for which the expenditures have been made. That brings us again back to this section of the Revised Statutes that I read; that "sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the object for which they are respectively made, and no other"; and the comptroller general would not be worth his salt if he believed that moneys were used for a specific use not provided for in the appropriation and did not report it to Congress and hold that an expenditure under it could not be made at all. If he failed to do it he would be removable from office.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Iowa has expired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. LUCE].

The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a division.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts demands a division.

The committee divided; and there were—ayes 33, noes 66.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman desire to offer another amendment?

Mr. LUCE. Yes. I have several amendments relating to the same subject.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts offers another amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LUCE: Page 11, line 4, insert after the word "advisable" a new sentence as follows: "In such regular report or in special reports at any time when Congress is in session he shall make recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditure."

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman desire recognition?

Mr. LUCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Even if every one of these amendments shall be voted down, I trust a service will have been rendered by putting into the Record a statement by gentlemen representing the committee regarding their purpose, in order that reference may be made to it in the performance of the duties of this new office, so that it may be very clear what the committee intended.

If you look at the bill you will find that its first section requires a report in writing with recommendations concerning legislation that the comptroller general may deem necessary to facilitate a proper and accurate rendition and settlement of accounts, and concerning such other matters relative to the receipt and disbursement of the public funds as he may think advisable. The critical function on the part of the comptroller is wholly covered by the words "such other matters," leaving it entirely to his own judgment as to whether he shall recommend in matters of economy and efficiency or not. It may be that the words "such other matters" adequately meet the exigency, but if they do not meet the exigency I respectfully suggest that the explanatory sentence which I have proposed will throw light upon what Congress expects from this law.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to the amendment offered by the gentleman.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the amendment again reported, if the Chair please.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment will again be reported.

The amendment was again read.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, I offer another amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LUCE: Page 11, line 9, after the word "committee," insert the words "or the bureau of the budget." Page 11, line 10, after the word "committee," insert the words "or bureau." Page 11, line 11, after the word "committee," insert the words "or bureau."

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, as the bill now stands, I can discover no connection between the bureau of the budget and the comptroller general. Apparently the comptroller general is to deal directly with Congress, and there is nowhere that I can discover any provision that the ideas or discoveries of the comptroller general shall be put at the command of the bureau of the budget in order that the President may be assisted in shaping his recommendations. This complete separation of these two branches may not have been intended by the committee. If no fundamental objection presents itself for putting the comptroller general's office at the service of the bureau of the budget, I trust the committee will consent that the bureau of the budget may profit by the investigations, observations, studies, and criticisms of the comptroller general; and until I learn whether or not that seems objectionable to the chairman I will not comment further on the proposal.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, it was the opinion, I think, of everyone who appeared before the committee that the ideal system of Government finance, so far as appropriations and expenditures go, embraces two distinct and separate functions. In the first place, it is the duty of the office that pays out the money to make an estimate of what its requirements will be. Congress acts upon that estimate. Then comes this separate and distinct office, semi-judicial in character, which determines whether or not expenditures made are legal, and then audit the account. That department is intended as a check against extravagance. That department is intended to have a reflex influence upon the bureau of the budget. The bureau will know at all times that that department is watching it, and that for every appropriation that is made there will have to be a legitimate use.

Now, the gentleman's amendment brings in a new element. It would tie up these two separate things together. I do not believe there should be the closest relations between the two departments. I have found that when a man goes into a lawsuit it is just as well not to tell the opposite side what your testimony is before it is submitted to the jury. And so, in presenting the matter of the budget the President ought to be required at all times to present only a budget that he can justify, knowing that if he does not present a budget that he can justify in every particular Congress will attack it and that Congress will require the bureau of the budget to show how the expenditure of money asked for is necessary. It seems to me that with these checks and balances against estimates and

expenditures Congress will be placed in a position to judge as to the necessity for expenditures at all times. The amendment would give the Executive a power over the audit and control that it is not the intention or theory of the bill that the Executive shall have at all. If it is to be the office of criticism, of course it should be friendly criticism, intelligent criticism, but it ought not to be a mock trial. It ought to be upon real and substantial facts that are developed, and only in that way will it function in a healthy and economical manner, in my opinion.

Mr. LUCE. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. GOOD. Certainly.

Mr. LUCE. We are getting just what I am seeking, a record of what the committee means. Now, let us put a concrete proposition. Supposing the comptroller general ascertains that in some one of these buildings down here, in some department, 100 employees are at work where 50 could do the job. Under his program nothing is to be done about that until report is made to Congress. Does the gentleman see any objection to informing the bureau of the budget of that fact, in order that the President may prune his estimates accordingly?

Mr. GOOD. I call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that the appropriation has already been made, and the next estimate will be pruned, because the comptroller general will call the attention of Congress to the matter in his report, and the comptroller general will go before the committee having jurisdiction of that appropriation and will point out the fact that there is an expenditure that is useless and worthless and that ought to be eliminated.

Mr. LUCE. But, Mr. Chairman, the report of the comptroller general is to come in here on the day that Congress opens, while the budget must be prepared weeks in advance. What is the objection to allowing the bureau of the budget to learn of the waste and extravagances and the opportunities for retrenchment that have come to the knowledge of the comptroller general?

Mr. GOOD. The bureau of the budget will learn that fact.

Mr. LUCE. How?

Mr. GOOD. Just a few examples of the kind that the gentleman has called attention to, when they are exploded on the floor of the House or by the report of the comptroller general, will make the bureau of the budget more efficient, and unless you have that power to enforce efficiency I do not believe you will get efficiency. Besides, the fiscal year will only have about six months to run after the report of the comptroller is made.

Mr. LUCE. May I ask one question more?

Mr. GOOD. Certainly.

Mr. LUCE. Do I understand that you contemplate that the bureau of the budget shall be a criticizing body?

Mr. GOOD. No; the bureau of the budget is the body that initiates the estimates. It may be that it will criticize certain departments and expenditures to the President, but not so far as its published reports or public criticism are concerned. I do not see how that can be its function.

Mr. LUCE. The gentleman brings it out very clearly that the bureau of the budget is not to criticize. The comptroller general is to criticize, but the criticisms made by the comptroller general are not to be put at the command of the bureau of the budget, and therefore will not affect the estimates laid before them, but are to be retained for the information of Congress.

Mr. GOOD. Of course, if the bureau of the budget is worth anything at all, it will have to indulge in a great deal of criticism that goes to the President at all times, but the bureau of the budget does not make reports, except a request for appropriations through the President. That is not a criticism, but a request for the appropriation of money, and in that request for appropriation there is no place for criticism, because the President will submit what he thinks is an ideal plan and an estimate of appropriation for only those things that are absolutely necessary.

Mr. KITCHIN. I suggest that under the provision on page 3 the bureau of the budget, the director and the assistant can confer and consult with or get any information they desire from the comptroller general, and the comptroller general will have to give it to them.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, that did not escape my attention; but if the gentleman will read subsection (b) he will find that the power of the bureau of the budget in that particular is restricted to the operation of the department itself. He may investigate the way the comptroller general is doing the work.

Mr. KITCHIN. He must investigate and give any information concerning it which he has.

Mr. LUCE. Will the gentleman show me that point?

Mr. KITCHIN. I think the gentleman will see it for himself if he will read it.

Mr. LUCE. I have read it, but I do not see what the gentleman says.

Mr. KITCHIN. It says:

(b) All departments, bureaus, boards, commissions, offices, agencies, or other establishments of the Government, except the legislative branch and the Supreme Court, shall furnish to the President such information regarding the powers, duties, activities, organizations, financial transactions, and methods of business of their respective offices as he may from time to time require of them.

Could not the President require of the comptroller general any information regarding his duties? And if he finds that there are 100 offices down here that should be dispensed with, can not the President get that information from him, and would he not give that information to the President, and then could not the President authorize the bureau of the budget to check all of that information? The succeeding lines say:

And the director of the bureau of the budget, or any of his assistants or employees, when duly authorized by the President shall, for the purpose of securing such information, have access to and the right to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of any such department, bureau, board, commission, office, agency, or other establishment.

Mr. LUCE. My own study of the section does not lead me to the conclusion that they can do what the gentleman thinks they can do.

Mr. KITCHIN. Could they not do it?

Mr. LUCE. I do not believe it can be honestly twisted to that purpose.

Mr. KITCHIN. Whether that is the purpose or not, under that language could they not get any information from the comptroller general that he had, and would it not be for the President to call upon the comptroller general or for the director of the budget to call on the comptroller general for any information that he had, and would it not be the duty of the comptroller general under that language to give it to them?

Mr. LUCE. If that was done, the comptroller general would do the very thing that the gentleman from Iowa says he does not want done. We can not have in both fish and fowl. It must be one thing or the other.

Mr. KITCHIN. I am trying to show the gentleman what the act says he must do. I think the gentleman will find that language, if he reads it very carefully, covers his proposition.

Mr. LUCE. I have read it several times.

Mr. KITCHIN. I have no objection to the gentleman's amendment, because I think it would be in harmony with section 3, but I do not think it is necessary while section 3 remains in the bill.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to say by my answer that I would not have the comptroller advance any decision when requested. He does that every day and will continue to do it. The proposition of the gentleman is that the comptroller general shall, at the request of the bureau of the budget, send all his force there, if necessary, to direct assistants, to furnish it with information at any time. I think that would disorganize the comptroller's office.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to call attention to the fact that the bureau of the budget is simply a clerical force placed at the disposal of the President of the United States to furnish him with information as to how he shall make up the estimates for expenditures to be required for the conduct of the Government for any given year. There is no reason why the clerical force of the President for that purpose should be authorized to require the Comptroller and the Auditor of the Treasury to furnish it with information. The purpose of the clerical force of the President is to acquire what information it can by study of the departments. I apprehend that it will be the purpose of such a bureau as is to be furnished to the President to require of every bureau in the Government every particle of information that can be obtained to tell what the needs of the bureau may be.

On the other hand, it will be the function of the comptroller and auditor to supply the Congress, that is to be the critic of the administrative branch of the Government under this law, with such information as will enable it to intelligently criticize the acts of the administration.

Mr. CHINDBLUM. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MADDEN. I will.

Mr. CHINDBLUM. The President could at any time get the information.

Mr. MADDEN. Undoubtedly he could get it without asking for it, because section 3 of the bill provides amply for furnishing such information as is provided for in the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts.

There is no disposition on the part of the committee to prevent the administrative branch of the Government from getting

information. But the purpose is to separate the comptroller and auditor from the executive branch of the Government and leave it free as an instrumentality through which the legislative branch of the Government can get information which it has not been able to get heretofore, and thus leave the people's representatives to criticize any waste or extravagance of the administration by whomsoever it may be presided over.

And so I say that the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. LUCE] is not only unnecessary, but I think it will be unwise to adopt it. It is unnecessary because the law already contemplates that the information shall be furnished by the comptroller and auditor in section 3, but it would be unwise to adopt it because it ties the executive and the legislative hand and foot through the comptroller and the auditor, and that is exactly what we want to avoid.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. LUCE. Mr. Chairman, I offer another amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 11, line 11, after the word "request," insert a new sentence, as follows: "On a date to be fixed by the President he shall annually make a report to the bureau of the budget pointing out where appropriations may be reduced without injury to the public service, or where expenditure may be incurred for the sake of ultimate gain in economy or efficiency."

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. GARD. Is it not true that the committee has already adopted an amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAHAM] at this place?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can not remember whether the language is the same, but the Chair's recollection is that the amendments are very similar.

Mr. GARD. The amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts should follow the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAHAM].

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks that the gentleman from Massachusetts is entitled to have his amendment submitted, although it is almost in the same language. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts desire to press his amendment?

Mr. LUCE. I do, Mr. Chairman. I desire to press the amendment in order that I may still further insure that the Congress contemplates doing the thing which it was advised not to do by the specialists who appeared before the committee. Mr. Collins pointed out to the committee that the first of the three weaknesses of the British audit system is that the comptroller does not report contemporaneously with the discovery of irregularity. The attempt to separate the comptroller general from the bureau of budget is strictly contrary to the experience of England. It also is directly contrary to what was recommended to the committee by Gov. Lowden, of Illinois, who appeared before the committee and pointed out the value of the Illinois system. It is contrary to the experience of Massachusetts. It seems to me unfortunate that the committee should thus hamper the attempt to put at the command of the Executive as well as of Congress all the benefits of studies, investigations, and criticisms. Of course I expect that the amendment will be rejected, but in order that at some future occasion we may look back upon this amendment and determine which of us was right I present the amendment, still wishing that the committee would permit the President to know regularly and promptly all the discoveries and opinions of the comptroller general.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUCE. Yes.

Mr. GOOD. The gentleman, I think, forgets or overlooks the fact that the comptroller general is required to make his report to Congress. The President has that report, and the bureau of the budget has that report.

Mr. LUCE. Pardon me, but does the President have it before he puts in his budget?

Mr. GOOD. Oh, no. He has it at the same time that the President puts in his report.

Mr. LUCE. Then how does that help him make up his budget?

Mr. GOOD. The President is supposed to have a competent force to make up his budget. If we are going to take a part of this office to help the President make up his budget, I greatly fear that we are going to confuse the two, and instead of having the checks and balances we have been talking about, we will have neither a check nor a balance. I can not see the value of the gentleman's suggestion, nor do I see where the provisions of the bill in this instance are in conflict with suggestions made by a single person who appeared before the committee.

Mr. TEMPLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUCE. Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE. Does not the existing law provide that the Comptroller of the Treasury shall make preliminary rulings whenever a question of that sort is brought to attention, and does not this bill provide that the power now held by the Comptroller of the Treasury shall be conferred upon the comptroller general of the United States?

Mr. LUCE. I have not so read the bill. If that is the case, I shall be glad to have it go into the Record.

Mr. TEMPLE. It is in the existing law, which section 10 provides shall continue in the powers of the comptroller general.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected.

Mr. NELSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I shall vote for the pending bill because I believe in a national budget system and an independent audit of Government accounts. Budget systems have been instituted in at least 42 of our several States, and always with the most salutary results. It is the business way of doing the business of both the State and the Federal Government.

This legislation is one of the most important pieces of constructive legislation presented to Congress in the last quarter of a century, and the committee is to be congratulated upon the splendid bill it has presented for consideration. It is not, of course, a perfect bill, but lays the foundation for a constructive policy in national legislation that will mean much for the future welfare of our great Nation—a policy that will mean larger economy and greater efficiency. The taxpayers of our country are looking to Congress for relief in our enormous tax burdens which have evolved as a result of our Great World War. We must meet every emergency and every legitimate need, but must eliminate all waste and extravagance in every bureau and department of our Government. Bureaus and departments instituted to aid the Great War program and no longer needed should be quickly eliminated. The budget system as outlined in this bill will, in my judgment, help to fix the responsibility of our estimates and give to Congress a clearer conception of the real needs of our Government, and to meet these needs with an intelligent appreciation of our real duty. Our national expenses have increased with leaps and bounds until now they are simply enormous. We are told by reliable statisticians that the aggregate expenses of our Government from the days of the Declaration of Independence to the opening of the Great World War was approximately \$26,000,000,000, while Mr. Goon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, has just stated on the floor of the House that the expenses of the Government for the fiscal year of 1920 will probably be between five and six billions of dollars. Such an enormous expense placed upon the taxpayers of our country demands that it be instituted and carried out along the lines of the most approved business methods, and it is well known that every well-organized business concern to-day is run on the budget system. It clearly outlines its needs and makes a thorough estimate of what its income would be, and arranges the lines of activities accordingly. While it is true that a government will not be able to hew the lines as closely as business concerns, and we do not anticipate that it will, yet in a large sense the Government ought to have a clear conception of what its resources are and what its legitimate needs are, and then apply in an intelligent way the ways and means to provide for that need. The American public demands of Congress that it shall do its business along business lines, and a budget system is the one long step in this direction.

Let us, therefore, not only institute the budget system, but let us curtail expenses wherever possible without decreasing too much our efficiency. Indeed, let the American people feel that Congress is sympathetic with the tremendous burdens that they are now carrying in the taxing line. As I understand this bill, it does not in any way depreciate the importance or efficiency of the several committees in determining the various appropriations for governmental needs, but rather emphasizes the obtaining of the very best possible estimate from responsible sources for the determination of their legislation, and would therefore help these various committees in their difficult deliberations and final determination of the facts. This bill, as I understand it, will help to remove the large amount of duplication which is now so apparent in the activities of our Government. There is no question to-day but what the Government is taxing itself millions of dollars in duplication of work and efforts which should be promptly removed, and which no doubt would be removed to a very large degree through a system such as this bill would institute. This one element alone would be sufficient justification for passing this bill unanimously by Congress.

The independent audits provided for in this bill are, in my judgment, of tremendous importance, and are a distinct advance in the determination of our expenditures, and to ascertain cor-

rectly how our large appropriations should be expended, and will help us to eliminate the tremendous waste and extravagance which are so liable to creep in under a system of expenditures such as our Government has had in the past. As a whole, it is a piece of legislation which the country has demanded and which our Government needs, and which the people will appreciate, and which our Congress in years to come can be proud that it has this day initiated. It should have the unanimous support of the House and be speedily enacted into law. [Applause.]

The Clerk concluded the reading of the bill.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise and report the bill to the House with the amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. TOWNER, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9783) to provide a national budget system and an independent audit of Government accounts, and for other purposes, and had directed him to report the same back to the House with sundry amendments with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the bill and amendments to final passage.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the amendments will be put en grosse. The question is on the amendments.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Speaker, I offer the following motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman from Texas opposed to the bill?

Mr. BLANTON. I am not opposed to the principles of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Does any gentleman who is opposed to the bill desire to offer a motion to recommit? If not, the Clerk will report the motion of the gentleman from Texas.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. BLANTON moves to recommit the bill to the Select Committee on the Budget with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith, with the following amendment: On page 7, line 17, after the word "office," insert the words "for six years," and on page 8, strike out lines 1 to 7, inclusive, and on page 9, line 21, after the word "appoint," strike out the comma and insert the word "and," and on line 22, page 9, after the word "remove," strike out the comma and the words "and fix the compensation of."

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move the previous question on the motion to recommit.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Texas to recommit the bill.

The question was taken.

Mr. BLANTON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a division, and pending that I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas makes the point of order that there is no quorum present. The Chair is of opinion that there is not a quorum present. The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absentees; and the Clerk will call the roll. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 21, nays 258, answered "present" 2, not voting 150, as follows:

YEAS—21.			
Almon	Collier	McDuffie	Steagall
Bankhead	Dickinson, Mo.	McKeown	Upshaw
Blackmon	Gard	Oliver	Wingo
Blanton	Harley, Tex.	Parish	
Caraway	Huddleston	Quinn	
Clark, Mo.	Johnson	Ruby	
NAYS—258.			
Alexander	Hell	Browne	Carter
Anderson	Benham	Browning	Cahey
Andrews, Md.	Benson	Buchanan	Chandler
Andrews, Nebr.	Black	Burroughs	Christopherson
Anthony	Bland, Mo.	Butler	Clason
Ashbrook	Bland, Va.	Byrnes, S. C.	Clary
Aswell	Bales	Byrnes, Tenn.	Coady
Ayres	Bowers	Caldwell	Connally
Bakka	Box	Campbell, Kans.	Cooper
Baer	Briggs	Campbell, Pa.	Crogo
Barbour	Brooks, Ill.	Cannon	Crisp
Bea	Brooks, Pa.	Cares	Crowther

Currie, Mich.	Howard	Micahab, N. J.	Smith, Ill.
Curry, Calif.	Hudspeth	Monahan, Wis.	Smith, Mich.
Dale	Hullings	Mondell	Smithwick
Dallinger	Hull, Iowa	Mooney	Stelman
Darrow	Hull, Tenn.	Moore, Ohio	Steele
Davis, Minn.	Humphreys	Moran	Stevenson
Davis, Tenn.	Hutchinson	Mudd	Stevens, Ohio
Denison	Igoe	Murphy	Stevenson
Dickinson, Iowa	Jacoway	Neely	Stiness
Lominick	James	Nelson, Mo.	Strong, Kans.
Doughton	Johnson, S. Dak.	Nelson, Wis.	Strong, Pa.
Dowell	Johnson, Wash.	Newton, Minn.	Summers, Wash.
Duvar	Jones, Pa.	Nichols, Mich.	Summers, Tex.
Dupre	Juhl	Nolan	Sweet
Dyer	Kearns	O'Connell	Taylor, Colo.
Echols	Keller	O'Connor	Taylor, Tenn.
Edmonds	Kelly, Pa.	Oldfield	Temple
Elliott	Kettner	Olney	Thompson
Elston	King	Osborne	Tillman
Emerson	Kinkaid	Overstreet	Tilson
Evans, Nebr.	Kitchin	Palge	Timberlake
Evans, Nev.	Klecka	Park	Tinkham
Fairfield	Knutson	Phelan	Towner
Ferris	Kraus	Platt	Vail
Fess	Lampert	Purnell	Vare
Fisher	Lanham	Radcliffe	Venable
Fitzgerald	Lankford	Rainey, Ala.	Vestal
Focht	Larsen	Raker	Vinson
Fordner	Layton	Ramseyer	Volgt
Foster	Lazaro	Randall, Calif.	Volstead
Freeman	Lee, Calif.	Randall, Wis.	Walsh
French	Leibach	Reavis	Ward
Gallagher	Linthicum	Reber	Wason
Glynn	Lougera	Reed, W. Va.	Watkins
Good	Lougworth	Rhodes	Watson, Pa.
Graham, Pa.	Luce	Ricketts	Watson, Va.
Green, Iowa	Lusk	Riddick	Weaver
Greene, Mass.	Luhning	Rogers	Webb
Greene, Vt.	McArthur	Romjue	Webster
Griest	McLaughlin, Mich.	Rouse	Wetly
Hadley	McPherson	Rowe	Whaley
Hardy, Colo.	MacGregor	Rucker	White, Kans.
Hastings	Madden	Sanders, Ind.	White, Me.
Hawley	Magee	Sanders, N. Y.	Williams
Hayden	Major	Sanford	Wilson, La.
Hays	Mansfield	Scott	Wilson, Pa.
Hernandez	Mapes	Sears	Woods, Va.
Hershey	Mason	Sherwood	Woodward
Hersman	Mays	Shreve	Wright
Hickey	Mead	Sinclair	Young, N. Dak.
Hoch	Merritt	Sinnot	Young, Tex.
Holland	Michener	Slomp	
Houghton	Miller	Smith, Idaho	

#### ANSWERED "PRESENT"—2.

Candler Frear

#### NOT VOTING—150.

Ackerman	Gallivan	Lee, Ga.	Reed, N. Y.
Bacharach	Gandy	Leshner	Riordan
Barkley	Ganly	Little	Robinson, N. C.
Begg	Garland	McAndrews	Robison, Ky.
Bland, Ind.	Garner	McClintic	Rosenberg
Boomer	Garrett	McCulloch	Rose
Brand	Godwin, N. C.	McFadden	Rowan
Brinson	Goldfogle	McGlennon	Sabath
Britten	Goodall	McKenzie	Sanders, La.
Brumbaugh	Goodwin, Ark.	McKinley	Saunders, Va.
Burdick	Goodykantz	McKinley	Schall
Burke	Gould	McLane	Scully
Cantrill	Graham, Ill.	McLaughlin, Nebr.	Seals
Carew	Griffin	MacCrato	Siegel
Clark, Fla.	Hamill	Maber	Sims
Cole	Hamilton	Mann, Ill.	Sisson
Copley	Harrison	Mann, S. C.	Small
Costello	Haskell	Martin	Smith, N. Y.
Cramton	Haugen	Montague	Snell
Cullen	Heflin	Moore	Snyder
Dacey	Hicks	Moore, Pa.	Stephens, Miss.
Dempsey	Hill	Moore, Va.	Sullivan
Dent	Husted	Moore, Ind.	Swope
Dewalt	Ireland	Morin	Taylor, Ark.
Donovan	Jeffers	Mott	Thomas
Dooning	Johnson, Ky.	Newton, Mo.	Tincher
Doremus	Johnson, N. Y.	Nichols, S. C.	Treadway
Drane	Johnston, N. Y.	Ogden	Walters
Dunn	Kahn	Padgett	Wellington
Eagan	Kelley, Mich.	Parker	Wheeler
Eagle	Kendall	Pell	Wilson, Ill.
Ellsworth	Kennedy, Iowa	Peters	Winslow
Esch	Kennedy, R. I.	Porter	Wise
Evans, Mont.	Kleis	Pou	Wood, Ind.
Fields	Klineholc	Rainey, H. T.	Yates
Flood	Kroeder	Rainey, J. W.	Zihlman
Fuller, Ill.	LaGuardia	Ramsey	
Guller, Mass.	Langley	Rayburn	

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Until further notice:

Mr. FULLER of Massachusetts with Mr. THOMAS.

Mr. WOOP of Indiana with Mr. SMALL.

Mr. RONSON of Kentucky with Mr. NICHOLS of South Carolina.

Mr. LANGLEY with Mr. FIELDS.

Mr. TINCHER with Mr. JOHNSON of Mississippi.

Mr. TREADWAY with Mr. BOONER.

Mr. ACKERMAN with Mr. McLANE.

Mr. WHEELER with Mr. DRANE.

Mr. KAHN with Mr. DENT.



Mr. BACHARACH with Mr. MOON.  
 Mr. FREAR with Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas.  
 Mr. CRANTON with Mr. JOHN W. RAINEY.  
 Mr. GOODYKOONTZ with Mr. RAYBURN.  
 Mr. MOTT with Mr. FLOOD.  
 Mr. NEWTON of Missouri with Mr. EVANS of Montana.  
 Mr. OGDEN with Mr. EAGAN.  
 Mr. PARTEE with Mr. EAGAN.  
 Mr. PORTER with Mr. DORETUS.  
 Mr. KIESS with Mr. LEE of Georgia.  
 Mr. KREIDER with Mr. JOHNSTON of New York.  
 Mr. LA GUARDIA with Mr. JOHNSON of Kentucky.  
 Mr. LITTLE with Mr. HEFLIN.  
 Mr. MCCULLOCH with Mr. HARRISON.  
 Mr. McFADDEN with Mr. HAMILL.  
 Mr. GOULD with Mr. HENRY T. RAINEY.  
 Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois with Mr. PELL.  
 Mr. HAMILTON with Mr. PADGETT.  
 Mr. HASKELL with Mr. MOORE of Virginia.  
 Mr. MCKENZIE with Mr. GRIFFIN.  
 Mr. ZIEGLER with Mr. BARKLEY.  
 Mr. HADGEN with Mr. MONTAGUE.  
 Mr. HICKS with Mr. MARTIN.  
 Mr. RAMSEY with Mr. DOOLING.  
 Mr. BLAND of Indiana with Mr. WELLING.  
 Mr. ROSENBERG with Mr. DONOVAN.  
 Mr. ROSE with Mr. DEWALT.  
 Mr. SCHALL with Mr. DAVEY.  
 Mr. BETTEN with Mr. TAYLOR of Arkansas.  
 Mr. SELLS with Mr. CULLEN.  
 Mr. SIEGEL with Mr. CLARK of Florida.  
 Mr. BURDICK with Mr. SULLIVAN.  
 Mr. BURKE with Mr. SMITH of New York.  
 Mr. COLE with Mr. Sisson.  
 Mr. HUSTED with Mr. MANN of South Carolina.  
 Mr. IRELAND with Mr. MAHER.  
 Mr. MCKINLEY with Mr. GOLDFOGLE.  
 Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Nebraska with Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina.

Mr. MACCRATE with Mr. GARRETT.  
 Mr. COPLEY with Mr. SIMS.  
 Mr. COSTELLO with Mr. SCULLY.  
 Mr. DEMPSEY with Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia.  
 Mr. KELLEY of Michigan with Mr. MCKINNEY.  
 Mr. KENDALL with Mr. MCGLENNON.  
 Mr. KENNEDY of Iowa with Mr. McCLINTIC.  
 Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania with Mr. GANLY.  
 Mr. MOORES of Indiana with Mr. GANDY.  
 Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island with Mr. McANDREWS.  
 Mr. SWOPE with Mr. CAREW.  
 Mr. DUNN with Mr. SANDERS of Louisiana.  
 Mr. ELLSWORTH with Mr. SABATH.  
 Mr. FULLER of Illinois with Mr. ROWAN.  
 Mr. GARLAND with Mr. ROBINSON of North Carolina.  
 Mr. GOODALL with Mr. RIORDAN.  
 Mr. WALTERS with Mr. CANTRELL.  
 Mr. WILSON of Illinois with Mr. BRUMBAUGH.  
 Mr. WINSLOW with Mr. BRINSON.  
 Mr. YATES with Mr. BRAND.  
 Mr. MORIN with Mr. GALLIVAN.  
 Mr. BEGG with Mr. WISE.

General:

Mr. SYDNER with Mr. GARNER.

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Speaker, I desire to vote "no," unless I am paired.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman is paired.

Mr. FREAR. Then I desire to answer "present."

Mr. CANDLER. Mr. Speaker, I am paired on this vote and therefore I answered "present" on the roll call. Mr. Speaker, permit me further to say that I am authorized by Mr. JOHN W. RAINEY to say that he would vote for this budget bill if he were present. He is away at home on account of a death.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER. A quorum is present, and the Doorkeeper will unlock the doors. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, on that I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 285, nays 3, not voting 143, as follows:

#### YEAS—285.

Alexander	Andrews, Nebr.	Ayres	Barbour
Almon	Anthony	Babka	Bea
Anderson	Ashbrook	Baer	Bell
Andrews, Md.	Aswell	Bankhead	Benham

Benson	Fess	Inhring	Sanders, Ind.
Black	Fisher	McAndrews	Sanders, La.
Blair, Ind.	Fitzgerald	McArthur	Sanders, N. Y.
Blair, Mo.	Focht	McCallach	Sanford
Blair, Va.	Fordney	McCallie	Scott
Blanton	Foster	McKeown	Sears
Boles	Frear	McLaughlin, Mich.	Sherwood
Bowers	French	McLendon	Shreve
Box	Gallagher	McMason	Sinclair
Briggs	Gard	MacGregor	Sluett
Brooks, Ill.	Glynn	Madden	Slomp
Brooks, Pa.	Good	Magee	Smith, Idaho
Browne	Goodall	Major	Smith, Ill.
Browning	Graham, Pa.	Mann, S. C.	Smith, Mich.
Brumbaugh	Green, Iowa	Mansfield	Smithwick
Buchanan	Greene, Mass.	Mapes	Stedman
Burroughs	Greene, Vt.	Martin	Steele
Butler	Griest	Mason	Stecherson
Byrnes, S. C.	Hadley	Mays	Stephens, Ohio
Byrnes, Tenn.	Hardy, Colo.	McAd	Stevenson
Caldwell	Hardy, Tex.	Merritt	Stiness
Campbell, Kans.	Hastings	Michener	Strong, Kans.
Campbell, Pa.	Hawley	Miller	Strong, Pa.
Candler	Hayden	Minahan, N. J.	Summers, Wash.
Canon	Hays	Monahan, Wis.	Summers, Tex.
Caraway	Hernandez	Mondell	Sweet
Carss	Hersman	Mooney	Taylor, Colo.
Carter	Hickey	Moore, Ohio	Taylor, Tenn.
Casey	Hoch	Morgan	Temple
Childsblom	Holland	Mudd	Thompson
Christopherson	Houghton	Murphy	Tillman
Clark, Mo.	Howard	Neely	Tilson
Classon	Huddleston	Nelson, Mo.	Timberlake
Cleary	Hudspeth	Nelson, Wis.	Tinkham
Coady	Hullings	Newton, Minn.	Towner
Collier	Hull, Iowa	Nichols, Mich.	Uphaw
Connally	Hull, Tenn.	Nolan	Vaile
Cooper	Humphreys	O'Connell	Vare
Crabo	Hutchinson	O'Connor	Venable
Crisp	Igoe	Oldfield	Vestal
Crowther	Jacoway	Oliver	Vinson
Currie, Mich.	James	Olney	Volz
Curry, Calif.	Johnson, S. Dak.	Osborne	Volstead
Dale	Johnson, Wash.	Overstreet	Walsh
Dallinger	Jones, Pa.	Paige	Ward
Darrow	Jones, Tex.	Park	Wason
Davey	Juul	Parish	Watkins
Davis, Minn.	Keafins	Phelan	Watson, Pa.
Davis, Tenn.	Keller	Platt	Watson, Va.
Denison	Kelly, Pa.	Purnell	Weaver
Dickinson, Mo.	Kettner	Quin	Webb
Dickinson, Iowa	Kitchin	Radcliffe	Webster
Dominick	Klezka	Rainey, Ala.	Welby
Doremus	Knudson	Raker	Wetley
Doughton	Kraus	Ramsayer	White, Kans.
Dowell	Lampert	Randall, Calif.	White, Me.
Dunbar	Latham	Randall, Wis.	Williams
Dupre	Laukford	Reavis	Wilson, La.
Dyer	Larsen	Reber	Wilson, Pa.
Edmols	Layton	Reed, W. Va.	Wingo
Elliott	Lazaro	Rhodes	Woods, Va.
Elston	Lee, Calif.	Ricketts	Woodward
Emerson	Leblach	Rogers	Wright
Evans, Nebr.	Linthicum	Romjue	Young, N. Dak.
Evans, Nev.	Louergan	Rouse	Young, Tex.
Fairfield	Longworth	Rowe	
Ferris	Luce	Rubey	
	Lutkin	Rucker	

#### NAYS—3.

#### NOT VOTING—143.

Blackmon	Moore	Stegall
Ackerman	Gandy	Kreider
Bacharach	Ganly	LaGuardia
Barkley	Garland	Langer
Begg	Garner	Lee, Ga.
Boehrer	Garrett	Leshner
Brand	Godwin, N. C.	Little
Brinson	Goldfogle	McClintic
Britten	Goodwin, Ark.	McLadden
Burdick	Goodykoontz	McGlenron
Burke	Gould	McKinley
Cantrell	Graham, Ill.	McKinley
Carew	Griffin	McLaurie
Clark, Fla.	Hamill	McLaughlin, Nebr.
Col	Hamilton	MacCrane
Copney	Harrison	Maier
Costello	Haskell	Mann, Ill.
Cranton	Haugen	Montague
Cullen	Hefflin	Moore, Pa.
Dempsey	Hershey	Moore, Va.
Dent	Hicks	Moore, Inc.
Dewalt	Hill	Morin
Donovan	Husted	Mott
Dooling	Ireland	Newton, Mo.
Drane	Jefferts	Nicholls, S. C.
Dunn	Johnson, Ky.	Ogden
Eagan	Johnson, Miss.	Padgett
Eagle	Johnston, N. Y.	Parler
Ellsworth	Kahn	Pell
Esch	Kelley, Mich.	Peters
Evans, Mont.	Kendall	Porter
Fields	Kennedy, Iowa	Pou
Flood	Kennedy, R. I.	Raney, H. T.
Fremman	Kless	Raney, J. W.
Fuller, Ill.	Kincheloe	Ramsay
Fuller, Mass.	King	Rayburn
Gallivan	Kinkaid	Reed, N. Y.

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following additional pairs:

Until further notice:

Mr. BENKE with Mr. SMITH of New York.



Mr. COLE with Mr. Sisson.  
 Mr. BRITTON with Mr. TAYLOR of Arkansas.  
 Mr. KENDALL with Mr. MCGLENNON.  
 Mr. KENNEDY of Iowa with Mr. MCCLINTIC.  
 Mr. KRESS with Mr. LEE of Georgia.  
 Mr. KREMER with Mr. JOHNSTON of New York.  
 Mr. LA GUARDIA with Mr. JOHNSON of Kentucky.  
 Mr. FULLER of Massachusetts with Mr. THOMAS.  
 Mr. WOOD of Indiana with Mr. SMALL.  
 Mr. ROSSON of Kentucky with Mr. NICHOLS of South Carolina.  
 Mr. GARLAND with Mr. ROBINSON of North Carolina.  
 Mr. GOODYKOONTZ with Mr. RAYBURN.  
 Mr. GOULD with Mr. HENRY T. RAINEY.  
 Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois with Mr. PELL.  
 Mr. HAMPTON with Mr. PADGETT.  
 Mr. HARKELL with Mr. MOORE of Virginia.  
 Mr. MORIN with Mr. GALLIVAN.  
 Mr. MOTT with Mr. FLOOD.  
 Mr. NEWTON of Missouri with Mr. EVANS of Montana.  
 Mr. LANGLEY with Mr. FIELDS.  
 Mr. LITTLE with Mr. HEFLIN.  
 Mr. McEADEN with Mr. HAMILL.  
 Mr. McKINLEY with Mr. GOLDFOGLE.  
 Mr. HAUGEN with Mr. MONTAGUE.  
 Mr. HICKS with Mr. MARTIN.  
 Mr. McLAUGHLIN of Nebraska with Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina.  
 Mr. MACCRATE with Mr. GARRETT.  
 Mr. OGDEN with Mr. EAGAN.  
 Mr. PARKER with Mr. EAGLE.  
 Mr. RAMSEY with Mr. DOOLING.  
 Mr. TINCER with Mr. JOHNSON of Mississippi.  
 Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania with Mr. GANLY.  
 Mr. IRELAND with Mr. MAHER.  
 Mr. KELLEY of Michigan with Mr. McKINNEY.  
 Mr. MOORES of Indiana with Mr. GANDY.  
 Mr. TREADWAY with Mr. BOOPER.  
 Mr. ACKERMAN with Mr. McLANE.  
 Mr. WHEELER with Mr. DRANE.  
 Mr. ROSENBERG with Mr. DONOVAN.  
 Mr. ROSE with Mr. DEWALT.  
 Mr. SELLS with Mr. CULLEN.  
 Mr. SIEGEL with Mr. CLARK of Florida.  
 Mr. SWOPE with Mr. CAREW.  
 Mr. WATERS with Mr. CANTRELL.  
 Mr. WINSLOW with Mr. BRINSON.  
 Mr. YATES with Mr. BRAND.  
 Mr. ZIEGLER with Mr. BARKLEY.  
 Mr. SNELL with Mr. WELLING.  
 Mr. HUSTED with Mr. RIORDAN.  
 Mr. JEFFERIS with Mr. HARRISON.  
 Mr. KING with Mr. GRIFFIN.  
 Mr. KAEN with Mr. DENT.  
 Mr. BACHARACH with Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas.  
 Mr. SNYDER with Mr. GARNER.  
 Mr. BEGG with Mr. WISE.  
 Mr. COPLEY with Mr. SIMS.  
 Mr. COSTELLO with Mr. SCULLY.  
 Mr. BURDICK with Mr. SULLIVAN.  
 Mr. CRAMPTON with Mr. JOHN W. RAINEY.  
 Mr. DEMPSEY with Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia.  
 Mr. ELLSWORTH with Mr. SABATHI.  
 Mr. FULLER of Illinois with Mr. ROWAN.  
 The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.  
 On motion of Mr. GOON, a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the bill was passed was laid on the table.  
 Mr. WINGO. Mr. Speaker, my colleague, Mr. GOODWIN, is sick, and in his behalf I ask leave of absence for him for the day on account of illness. I am authorized to state that if he were present, he would vote "aye."  
 Mr. MAGEE. Mr. Speaker, I desire to state that Representative SNYDER, of New York, is unavoidably absent. If he were present, he would have voted for the bill.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members of the House may have three legislative days in which to insert their own remarks on the budget system in the Record.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Iowa asks unanimous consent that all Members of the House may have three legislative days in which to insert their remarks on this bill. Is there objection?

Mr. GOOD. The request is that they may insert their own remarks.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. On the bill?

Mr. GOOD. Yes.

The SPEAKER. That they may insert their own remarks on the bill. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks by publishing a letter that I have received from a major in the Army, containing valuable information, as I view it, in regard to war-risk insurance.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record by inserting a letter from an officer in the Army relative to war-risk insurance. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS.

Mr. JACOWAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks by inserting in the Record an editorial from the Arkansas Methodist, of Little Rock, Ark., edited by Dr. A. C. Miller, in regard to Americanism.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the gentleman's request?

Mr. WALSH. I object.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Massachusetts objects.

#### CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to file the minority views from the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the bill (H. R. 9822) authorizing a conference on international communication.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas asks unanimous consent to file minority views of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the bill (H. R. 9822) authorizing a conference on international communication. Is there objection?

Mr. ROGERS. Reserving the right to object, I want to ask the gentleman if he is filing that this afternoon?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; right now.

The SPEAKER. The Chair hears no objection.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. Speaker, I also ask unanimous consent to have the report printed in the Record for the information of the Members, because there is some doubt if we can get the printed report back by to-morrow, and the bill may come up to-morrow.

Mr. ROGERS. I shall have to object.

The SPEAKER. Objection is made.

#### ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 4 o'clock and 52 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, October 22, 1919, at 12 o'clock noon.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, transmitting a tentative draft of a bill to provide for the payment of the bonus and travel pay to enlisted men of the naval service who have been or may hereafter be discharged for the purpose of reenlisting therein, as provided for the Regular Army in the act of September 29, 1919 (H. Doc. No. 268), was taken from the Speaker's table, referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. COADY, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to which was referred the bill (S. 3190) to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Pocomoke River at Pocomoke City, Md., reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 392), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Kansas, from the Committee on Rules, to which was referred the resolution (H. Res. 352) for the immediate consideration of the House committee substitute for S. 2775, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 393), which said resolution and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. MERRITT, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 9853) granting the consent of Congress to the board of county commissioners of the county of Hartford, in the State of Connecticut, to construct a bridge across the Connecticut River between Windsor Locks and East Windsor, at Warehouse Point, in said county and State, reported the same without amend-